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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
GLOSBTG i^UDRESS
By
ROBERT K* JACKSON
Chief of Counsel for The United States
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Presiclent and Members of the Tribunal:
An advocate can be confronted v/ith fev/ more formidable tasks
than to select his closins arguments v;here there is great disparity
betv/een his appropriate time and his a-wailable material* In eight
; months — a' short time as s^ate trials go — we have introduced evi
dence which embraces as vast and varied a panorama of events as has
ever been compressed within the frame work of a litigation. It is
impossible in summation to do more than outline with bold strokes
the vitals of this trial's inad melartcholy record, which will
V
live as the historical text of . the Tvrentieth Century's shame and
depravity* ' "
It, is common to think of our own time as standing at the apex
of civilization, from which the deficiencies of preceding ages ,may
patronizingly be viev/ed in the light of what is assu/oed to be
"progress;" The reality is that in the long perspective of history
the present century v/ill not hold an admirable position, unless
its seoond half is to redeem its first. These two-score years in
this Twentieth Century will be recorded in the book of years as one
of the most bloody in all annals. Two Vforld V/ars have left a legacy
of dead which number more than all the armies engaged in any v/ar
that made ancient or medieval history. No half-century ever wit
nessed slaughter on such a scale, such cruelties and inhumanities,
such vftiolesale deportations of peoples into slavery, such annihila
tions, of Diinorities, The Terror Torquemada pales before the
Kazi Inquisition, These deeds are the overshadovdng historical
facts by which generations to come vdll remember this decade. If
we cannot eliminate the causes and prevent the repetition of these
barbaric events, it is not an irresponsible prophecy to say that
this Tv^entiCth Century may yet succeed in bringing the doom o:^
civilization.
Goaded by these facts, v/e have moved to redress the blight
on the record of our era. The defendants complain that our pace
I
\ fastc Xn. drawing the Charter of tliis Tribunal, we thought
were recording an ac'complished advance in International Law^
But they say that v/e have outrun our times, that v/e have anticipated
an advance that should be, but has not yet been made® The Agree
ment of London, v/hether it originates or merely records, at all
events marks a transition in International Law which roughly cor
responds to that in the evolution of local law when men ceased to
punish local crime by "hue and cry" and began to let reason and in
quiry govern punishment» The society of nations has emerged from
the primitive "hue and cry," the law of "catch and killo" It seeks
to apply sanctions to enforce International Law^ but to guide their
application by evidence, lav;-, and reason instead of outcry. The _
defendants denounce the lav/ u^ider which their accounting is asked.
Their dislike for the law v/hich conderoras them is nor origiBal. It"
has been remarked before that -
"No thief ere felt the halter rlrav;
'./ith good oninion of the lav/^"
I shall not labor the law of this case. The position of the
United States was explained in my opendng statement. Jiy distin
guished colleague, the Attorney General of Great Britain, will reply
on behalf of all the Chief Prosecutors to the defendants' legal
attack. At this stage of the proceedings, I shall rest upon the
lavf of these crimes as laid dov/n in the Charter. The defendants,
who except for the Charter would have no right to be hoard at all,
now ask that the legal basis of this trial be nullified. This
Tribunal, of course, is given no power to set aside or to modify
the Agreement between the Four to which nineteen other
nations have adhered. The terms of the Charter are conclusive upon
every party to these proceedingso
Xn interpreting the Charter, however, v/e should not overlook
the urdiue and emergent character of this body as an International
Military Tribunal. It la.no part of the constitutional mechanism
of internal justice of any of the signatory nations. Gerraany has "
unconditionally surrendered, but no peace treaty has been signed or
.. - : ......i,, • rfrnntiiilri-1' liwLwitUrthwf-
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agreed upon, Ttie Allias are still technically in a state 0^ war
with Geriiiany, although the enei-oj '^s political and military institu
tions ha^e collapsed. As a Military Tribunal, it is a continuation
of the v^ar effort of the Allied nations. , As an International Tri
bunal, it is not boTOiid by the procedural and substantive refine
ments of our respective judicial or constitutional systems, nor v/ill
its rulings introduce precedents into any ot- ntry's Internal system
of civil justice. As an International mi^.tary Tribunal^ it rises
above the provincial and transient and seeks guidance not only from
International Lav/ but also from the basic principles of jurispru
dence v/hich' are assuraptions of civilization and which long have
found embodiment in the codes of all nations.
Of one thing we may be sure. The future will never have to
' ask, with misgiving, 'That could the Nazis have said in their favor.
History v;ill knov/ that v/hatever could be said, they were allowed
to say. • They have been given the kind of a trial t/hich they, in
the days of their pomp and pov;er, never gave to any man.
But fairness is not v/eakness. Ths extraordinary fairness of
these hearings is an attribute of our strength. The prosecutiorMs
i
case, at its close, seemed inherently unassailable because it
rested so heavily on German documents of unauestioned Authenticity.
But it was the weeks upon weeks of pecking at this case b;^ one
after another of the defendants that has demonstrate'd its true
strength. The fact is- that the testimony of the defendants l^as
removed any doubts of guilt which, because of the extraordinary
nature and magnitude of these crimes, may have existed before they
spoke. They have helped write their ovm judgment of ©ondemnation.
But justice in this case has nothing to do with some of the
arguments put fobth by the defendants' or their oourssel. 7fe have not
previously and we need not nov/ discuss the merits of all their
obscure and tortuous philosophy. V/e are not t rying them for
possession of obnoxious ideas. It is their right, if they choose,
• to renounce the Hebraic heritage in the civilization of which Germany
. i
was onoe a part. Kor is it bur affair that tbey repudiated, the
Hellenic influence as well. The intellectual banhmiptcsy and moral
perversion of the Nazi regime might have been no con®eini of. Inter
national Law had it not been utilized to goosestep the Herrenvolk
across international f\_^tiers. It is not their thoughts, it is
their overt acts which we charge to he crimes. Their creed and
teachings are important only as evidence of motive-, purpose, know
ledge, and intent, ' .V
* /
We charge :unla.v/ful aggression but we are not trying the
j
motives, hopes, or frustrations which may have led Germany to resort
to-aggressive war as an'instrument of policy, The law, unlike poli
tics, does not concern itself with the good or evil in the status
CLUO. nor v/ith the merits of grievances against it. It merely re
quires that the status quo be not'attacked by violent means and
that policies be not advanced by war. We may admit that overlapping
ethnological and cultural groups, economic barriers, and conflicting
national ambitions created in the 193i0*g, as they vdll continue 'to
create, grave problems for Germany as well as for the other peoples
of Europe. I'e may admit too that the world had failed to provide
political or legal remedies vmich would be honorable and acceptable
alternatives to war, V/e do not Underwrite either the ethics or
the wisdom of any country, including ray own, In the face of these
problems^ But w© do say that It is now, as it v/as for sometime
prior to 1959, illegal and criminal for Germany or any other nation
to redress grievances or seek expansion by resort to aggressive war.
Let me emphasize one'cardinal point, Thp United States has
no interest v/hioh would be advanced by the conviction of any defen
dant 'if we have not proved him guilty on at least one of the counts
charged against him in the Indictment. Any result that the calm
"and critical judgment of posterity would pronounce unjust, would
not be a victory for any of the countries associated in this proseou-
!
tion. But in summation v;e now have before us the tested evidences
biT criminality and have heard the flirosy excuses and paltry evasions
' 'V'I'lif-f,) 'ii'ii I- III . ' . 'A'
.V--
of the defendants. The suspended judgment vdth vdiich vie opened
this case is no longer appropriate» The time has come for final
judgment and if the case I present seems hard and uncoii^romising,
it is because the evidence makes it so,
I perhaps can do no better service than to try to lift this
case out of the morass of detail with which the record is fulX and
put before you only the bold outlines of a case that is impressive
in its simplicity. True^ its thousands of documents and more
thousands of pages of testimony deal v/ith an. epoch and cover a
Continent, and touch almost every branch of human endeavor. They
illuminate specialties, such as diplomacy, naval development and
warfare, land v/arfare, the genesis of air warfare, the politics
of the Nazi rise to power, the finance and economics of totali
tarian war,- sociology, penology, raass psychology, and mass
pathology.' I must leave it to experts to comb the evidence and
write volumes on their specialties, while I pictui*e in broad
strokes the offenses whose acceptance as lav/ful vrould threaten
the continuity of civilization, I must, as Kipling put It,
"splash at a ten-league canvas wit'i brushes of comet's hair»"
THE CRIMES OF THE NAZI REGIIvE
The strength of the case against these defendants under the
conspiracy count, v/hich it is the duty of the United States to
argue, is in its simplicity. It involves but three ultimate in
quiries: First, have the acts defined by the Charter as crimes
been committed; second, v/ere they comHiitted pursuant to a common
plan or conspiracy; third, are the^a defendants among those who
are criminally responsible?
The charge req.ulres examination of a oriLiiinal policy, not of
a multitude of isolated, unplanned, or disputed crimes. The sub
stantive crimes-upon which we rely, either as goals of a common
plan or as means for its accomplishment, are admitted. The pillars
which uphold the conspiracy charge may be found in five grouns of
overt acts, v/hose character and jiummnitude are important considera*.
... I I' iiii III I- I II ilnnrih iimh' v-..* i.-.. iw..
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tions in appraising the proof of oonspiracy.
!• Tile Seizure of ?o "or and Sub.jugation
of Geriuany to a Folice State,
The Nazi Party seized control of the Gernan state in 1933,
'^Seizure of povier" is a characterization used by defendants and
defense v/itne^ises, and so apt than it has passed into both history
and 8very-day speech. (1)
The Nazi jumta in the early days lived in constant fear of
overthrow. Goering, in 1934, pointed out that its enemies were
legion and said.
"Therefore the concentration camps have been created,
where we have first confined thousands of Communists
and Social Democrat functionaries." {^)
In 1933 Goering forecast the v/hole program of purposeful
cruelty and oppression when ho publicly announced:
"V;fhoever in the future raises a hand against a repre
sentative of the National Socialist movement or of
the State, must know '-hat he will lose his life in
a very short while.
New political crimes were created to this end. It was
lade a treason, punishable v/ith death, to organize or support a
political party other than the Nazi party,Circulating a false
or exaggerated statement, or one v/hich v/ould harm the state or even
the Party, was made a crime.Laws v^ere enacted of such ambiguity
that they could be used to pionish almost any innocent act. It
was, for example, made a crime to provoke "any act oontrary to the
public welfare."(6)
The doctrine ot punishment by analogy was introduced to en
able conviction for acts v/hich no statute forbade. ("^5 Minister of
tTustioe Guertner exdained that National Socialism, considered every
violation of the goals of life which the community set up for it
self to be a wrong per se, and that the act could be punished even
(0)
though it was not contrary to existing "formal" lav/.
The Gestapo and the SD were instrinnentalities of an espionage
syatam which penetrated puhlie and private llfe.t®) Goering oon-
troilad a personal wire-tapping unit,C°) All privacy of ooBimunlca-
s-
tion was abolished*Party bX pcklsiters, appointed over eYery 50
bouseliolds, continuously spied on 'ill within their ken*^^^^ Upon
the strength of this spying individuals v/ere dragged off to "pro
tective custody" and to concentration camps, without legal proceed
ings of any kind,^^^) and v/ithout statement of any reason therefol'i'^'
The partisan political police v/ere exempted from effective legal
responsibility for their aots*^^^)
Vith all administrative offices in Nazi control and v/ith the
Reichstag reduced to impotence, t'.:x.e judiciary remained the last
obstacle to this reign of tensor* But its independence was
soon overcome and it was reorganized to dispense a venal justicel^'^'
Judges were ousted for political or racial reasons and were spied
upon and put under pressure to Join the Nazi Party,After the
Supreme Court had acquitted three of the four men whom the Nazis
its
accused of setting the Reichstag fire,/jurisdiction over treason
transferred
cases v/as / - to a newly established "People^s Court" consisting
of two judges and five party offIcials.^ The German film of this
"People's Court" in operation, v/hich we showed in this chamber, re-
•wealed its presiding judge pouring partisan abuse upon speechless
defendants.Special courts v/ere created to try political
{PI )
crimes, only party members were appointed judges,^ ^ and "Judges
letters" Instructed the puppet judges as to the "general lines"
they must follow*(2S)
The result was the removal of all peaceable means either to
i^asist or to change the government. Having sneaked through the
portals of power, the Nazis slammed the gate in the face of all
others who might also aspire to enter. Since the law was what the
^azis said it was, every form of opposition v/as rooted out, and
every dissenting voice throttled, Germany was in the clutch of a
police state, which used the fear of the concentration oan^ as a
Queans to enforce rLon-resistance, The Party v/as the State, the '•
<tMM,.1'.'../ri-fcW >V'-Ji iii'^ '"tflkiilj't '^^ *iri i'<"t
./ft;;
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State v/as the Party, and terror by day and death by night v/ere the
policy of both.
S'» The Preparation and V/aging of Vifars of Aggression.
JTrom the moment the Nazis seized power, they set about
feverish but stealthy efforts, in defiance of the Versailles Treaty,
to arm for v/ar. In 1933 they found no airforce* By 1939 they had
21 squadrons, consisting of 240 echelons or about 2,400 first-line
planes, together with trainers and transports. In 1933 they found
an army of 3 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions. By 1939 they had
raised and equipped an army of 51 divisions, four of which were
fully motorized and four of v/hioh were panzer divisions® In 1933
they found a navy of one cruiser and 6 light cruisers. By 1939
they had built a navy of 4 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 6
cruisers, 22 destroyers, and 54 submarines. They had also built up
in that period an armament industry as efficient as that of any
country in the world
These new weapons were put to use, commencing in September
1939, in a series of undeclared wars against nations with which
G-ermany had arbitration and non-aggression treaties, and in viola
tion of repeated assurances.(^^5 On September 1, 1939 this rearmed
Germany attacked Poland, Tlie following April witnessed the in
vasion and occupation of Denmark and Norway, and May saw the ovor-
running of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Another
Spring found Yugoslavia and Greece under attack, and in lune 1941
came the invasion of Soviet Russia, Then Japan, v/hich Germany had
embraced as a partner, struck v/ithout v/arning at Pearl Harbor in
December 1941 and four days later Germany declared vrar on the
United States,
Ue need not trouble ourselves about the many abstract diffi
culties that can be conjured up about what constitutes aggression
in doubtful G'ases. I shall show you, in discussing the conspiracy,
pc
that by any test e^er put forv/arh by any responsible authority, by
all the oanons of plain sense, these v/ere unlawful wars of aggres
sion in breach of treaties and in violation of assurances.
3. V/arfare in Disregard of International Law.
It is unnecessary to labor this point on the facts. Goering
asserts that the Rules of Land Vfarfare were obsolete, that no nation
could fight a total vmr within their lli:iits.' ' He testified that
the Nazis would have denounced the Conventions to which Germany was
a party, but that General lodl v/anted captured German soldiers to
/ oc \
continue to benefit from their oba'^rvance by the Allies. '
It was, however, against the Soviet people and Soviet pris
oners that Teutonic fury Icnev; no bounds, in spite of a warning by
Miiiiral Canaris that the treatment vms in violation of International
Law-w ()
\Je need not, therefore, for purposes of the Conspiracy count,
recite the revolting details of starving, beating, murdering,
freezing, and mass exterrAlnation admittedly used against the
eastern soldiery. Also, we may take as established or admitted
that the lav/less conduct such as shooting British, and American air
men, mistreatment of V/estern prisoners of war, forcing French pris
oners of war into German war v/ork, and other deliberate violations
of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, did occur, and in obedience
to highest levels of authority.
Flnnder of Populations
In "Occu'pTe '^ Gountrijs,
The defendant Sauckel, Plenipotentiary General for the Utt-
lization of Labor,is authority for the statement that "out of
five million foreign workers who arrived in Germany, not even
200,000 came voluntarily."(It was officially reported to defen
dant Rosenberg that in his territory "recruiting methods were used
which probably have their origin in the blackest period of the slave
-t
u , r
- - Mv- .'
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tradeSauckel himself reported that male and female agents
v/ent hunting for men, got them drunh,- and "shanghaied" them to
Germany.These captives were shipped in trains without heat,
food, or sanitary facilities. The dead were throvm out at ^
stations, and the nev/born were thrown out the tvindows of moving
trains.
Sauckel ordered-that "all the men must he fedsheltered and
treated in such a v/ay as to exploit them to the highest possible ex
tent at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure."(34) About
two million of these were employed directly in-the manufacture of
(35)
armaments and munitions. ' The director of the Krupp Locomotive
factory, in Essen complained to the company that Russian forced
laborers were so underfed that they were too y/eakened to do their
work,'^ ^^ and the Krupp doctor confirmed their pitiable condition,
Soviet workers were put in camps under Gestapo guards, who were
allovjed to punish disobedience by confinement in. a concentration
camp or by hanging on the spot,(^^)
Populations of occupied countries v/ere otherwise exploited
and oppressed unmercifully. Terrorism was the order of the day.
Civilians were arrested v/ithout charges, committed without counsel,
executed without hearing. Villages v^rere destroyed, the male in
habitants shot or sent to concentration cariips, the v/oiiien sent to
foro,ed labor, and^ the children scattered abroad.The extent
of tha slaughter in Poland alone v;ae indicated by Frank, wiio re
ported*.
"If 1 wanted to have a poster ppt up for every seven /
Poles-who were shot, the forests of Poland would not .
suffice x^or producing the paper for such posters.
Those v/ho v/ill enslave men cannot be'expected to refrain
from plundering them. Boastful reports show hov/ thoroughly and
. scientifically the resources of occupied lands were sucked into the
German war economy, inflicting shortage, hunger, and inflation upon
•V. i-:
-•-fiJ. JHf.;
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(41)the inhabitants♦ Besides this grand plan to aid the German v.'ar
effort there were the sordid actlTrities of the Rosenberg Einsatzstab,
(42)
which pillaged art treasures for Goefing and his fellow-bandits.
It is hard to say whether the spectacle of Germany's No, 2 leader
urging his people to give up every coiiifort and strain every sinew
on essential v;ar vrark while,he rushed around confiscating art by the
trainload should be cast as tragedy or comedy. In either case it
-v/as a crime, . j
International Law at fill times before and during this vmr
spoke with' precision and authority respecting the protection due
civilians of an occupied country,and the slave trade and plunder
of occupied countries v;as at all times flagrantly unlawful.
• 5, Persecution and Ezter-nination of Jews and Christians
The Nazi movement will be of evil memory in history because
of its persecution of the Jews, the most far-flung and terrible
racial persecution of all time. Although the Nazi party neither
invented nor monopolized anti-Sb-uitism, its leaders from the very
beginning embraced it, incited it, and exploited it. They used it
as. "the psychological spark that ignites the mob," i\fter the
seizure of power, it became an official state policy. The persecu
tion began in a series of discriminatory laws eliminating the Jews
from the civil service, the professions, and economic life. As it
became more intense it included segregation of Jews in ghettos, and
exile. Riots 'were organized by party leaders to loot Jewish busi
ness places and to burn synagogues, Jev/ish property was confiscated
and'a collective fine of a billion marks was imposed ;upon Genraan
JeOTy. The program pfogfessed in fury and irresponsibility to the
-final solution," This consisted of sending all Jews v^o were fit
to v/ork to concentration camps as slave laborers, and all VjiiQ w-^re
not fit, which included children under 12 and people over 50, as
well as any others judged unfit by an SS doctor, to concentratiozi
(44)
camps for extermination.
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Adolf Elchmami, the sinister figure v/ho had charge of the
exterraination prograiii, has estimated that the anti-Jev/ish activities
resulted in the killing of six million lews. Of these, four million
Vi^ere killed in extex'mination institutions, and tv/o million were "
killed by Einsatzgruppen, mobile units of the Security Police and
SD which pursued lev^s in the ^ghettos and in their homes and
slaughtered them, by gas wagons, by mass shooting in anti-^tank ditches
and by every device which Nazi ingenuity could conceive. So thor- >
ough and uncorapromising was this program that the lev/s of Europe as •
a race no longer exist, thus fulfilling the diabolic "prophecy" of
Adolf Eitler at the beginning of the v^rar.f^^)
Of course, any such program must reckon v/ith the opposition
of the Christian Church. This was recognized from the very begin
ning. Defendant Bormann wrote all Gauleiters in 1941 that "Nation-
m
al Socialism and Christian ooriLcepts are. irreconciliable," and that
the people must be separated from the Churches and the Influence of
the Churches totally removed.Defendant Rosenberg even wrote
dreary treatises advocating a new and weird Nazi religion, )
The Gestapo appointed "Church speoialists" who vere instructed
that the ultimate aim was "destruction! of the confessional Churches?"
The record is full of specific instances of the persecution of
clergymen,''^ ®) the confiscation of Church property, interference
with religious publications, disruption of religious eduoatioii^ '^
and suppression of religious organizations,
The chief instrumentality for persecution and extermination
v/as the oonoentratlon camp, sired by defendant Goering and nurtured
under the overall authority of defendants prick and Koltenbrunner,
The horrors of these iniquitous places have been vividly dis
closed by documents'^ '^ and testified to by witnesses.Trl- '
buniQl must be satiated with ghastly verbal and pictorial portrayals.
Prom your records it is clear that the concentration camps were the
^ A J k. rAMlLfiAkHw ^.U HV0'. tr.. C-'•
o.-15-
first and v/orst v/eapon of• oppression used by tbe National Socialist
State, and that they ivere the primary means utilized for. the uer^
secution of the Christian Church and the extermination of the lewish
raee. This has been admitted to you by some of the defendants from
the witness stand,In the words of defendant Franh:
"A thousand years will pass and this guilt of rxermany
will still not be erased,"(57)
These, then, were the five great substantive crimes of the
Nazi regime. Their commission, v/hich cannot be denied, stands
i
admitted. The defendant Keitel, who is in a position to laiow the
facts, has given the Tribunal what seems to be a fair summation of
the case bn these facts:
"The defendant has declared that he admits the contents
of the general Indictment to be proved from the objective
and factual point of view (that is to say, not every in
dividual case) and this in consideration of the law of
procedure governing this trial. It would be senseless,
despite the possibility of refuting several documents
or individua:j.^f^Gts to attempt to shake the Indictment
as a 'Whole
I pass now to the inquiry whether these groups of criminal
acts were integrated in a common plan or conspiracy.
TKF COIvlION PLAN OP CONSPIRACY
The prosecution submits that these five categories of pre
meditated crimes were not separate and independent phenomena but
that all v/ere committed pursuant to a common plan or conspiracy.
The defense admits that these classes of crimes were committed but
denies that they are connected one with another as parts of a single
program
The central crime in this patter of crime, the kingpin which
holds them all together, is the plot for aggressive war. The chief
reason for international cognizance of these crimes lies In this
fact. Have we established the plan or conspiracy to make' aggres
sive war?
-14-.
Certain adnitted or clearly proven facts help answer that
question. First is the fact that such vrar of aggression did take •
plaee. Second, it is admitted that from the moment the Nazis came
to power, everyone of them and every one of the defendants worked
like beavers to prepare for some war. The question therefore comes
to this: v/ere they preparing for the war which did occur, or were
they preparing for some vrar which never has happened? It is prob
ably true that in the early days none of them had in mind what
month of v/hat year war would begin, the exact dispute which would
precipitate it, or whether its first impact vrould be Austria,
Czechoslovakia, or Poland. But I submit that the defendants either
knew or are chargeable with knov/ledge that the vrar for which they
were making ready v/ould be a war of German aggression. This is
partly because there v/as no real oxpectatlon that any power or com
bination of pov/ers would attack Germany. But it is chiefly because
the inherent nature of the German plans was such that they were
certain sooner or later to meet resistance and that they could then
be accomplished only by aggression.
The plans of Adolf Hitler for aggression were just as
secret as "I'lSIN KAlvxPF,'' of which over six million copies were pub
lished In Germany. He not only openly advocated overthrowing the
Treaty of Versailles, but made demands which v/ent far beyond a
mere rectifIcation of its alleged injustices,^®®' He avowed an
intention to attack neighboring, states and seize their lands,
which he said would have to be won with "the power of a triuraphant
(61)
sword." Here, for every German to hearken to, were the
"ancestral voices prophesying war."
Goering has testified in this courtroom that at his first
meeting with Hitler, long before the 'seizure of power„
"I noted that Hitler had a definite view of ttie impotency
of protest and, as a second point, that he v/as of the opinion
that Geriiiany should be freed of the Peace of Versailles,***
7'/e did not say v/e shall have to. have a war and defeat our
enemies; this was the alia 2nd the methods had to be
adapted to the political situation,
f
p
\
V/heH asked if this goal v/ere to he aocomplished by vrar if necessary,
Goering did not deny that eventuality but evaded a direct ansv/er by
saying, "V/e did not even debate about thosethings at that time," Ee
went on to say that the aim to overthrow the Treaty of "Versailles
was open and notorious and that "every German in my opinion was for
its modification, and there was no doubt that this was a strong
inducement for joining the party,Thus, there can be no pos-^
sible excuse for any person v^o aided Hitler to get absolute power
over the Gerraan people, or took a part in his regime, to fail to
know the miature of the dejsands he v/ould make on. Germany's neighbors,
Iinmediately after the seizure of power the Nazis went to v/ork
to implement these aggressive intentions by preparing for war. They
first enlisted German industrialists in a secret rearmament program.
Twenty days after the seizure of power Schacht v:as host to Hitler,
Goering, and some twenty leading industrialists, .-imong them v/ere
Krupp von Bohlen of the great Krupp armament v/orks and representa
tives of I, G, Farben and other Ruhr heavy industries^ Hitler and
Goering explained their program to the industrialists, who became
so enthusiastic that they aet ebout to raise three million Reichs-
marks to strengthen and confirm the Nazi Party in pov/er,^®^) Two
months later Krupp v/as working to bring a reorganized association
of German industry into agreeLient V7ith the political aims of the
Nazi government,Krupp later boasted of the success in keep
ing the German v/ar industries secretly alive and in readiness
despite the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty, and re
called the industrialists* enthusiastic acceptance of ^'the great
(66)
intentions of the Fuehrer in the rearmament period of 1933-39."
Some two months aftef Schact had sponsored this first meet
ing to gain the support of the industrialists, the Nazis moved to
harness industrial labor to their aggressive plans. In April 1953
HitlerorderedDi^, Ley "to take over the trade unions}' numbering some
6 million membeijrs. By Party directive Ley seized the unions, their
••I., t 'll'l-- I'l t\ 'dflfei i-bi ri
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, end their funds. Union leaders, taken into "protective
'-'istody" by the SS and SA were put into concentration
^IChe free labor unions were then renlaced by a Nazi organization known
as the Geriiian Labor Front, with Dr. Ley as its head. It was ex
panded until it controlled over 23 raillicn members. Collective
^largaining was eliminated, the ^oioe of labor could not longer he
heard as to working conditions, and the labor contract was prescribed
by "trustees of labor" appointed b,/ Hitler* The war purpose of
this labor program was clearly acknowledged by Robert Ley five days
after war broke out, when he declared in a speech that
"We National Socialist have monopolized all resources
and all our energies during the past seven years so as
to be able to be equipped for the supreme effort of
battle."
The Nazis also proceeded at once to adapt the government to
the needs of war. In April 1933 the Cabinet formed a Defense Council,
the vrorking committee of which mat frequently thereafter. In the
meeting of 23 May 1933, at which defendant Keltel presided, the memr
bers were instructed that
"No document must be lost since otherwise the enemy
propaganda would make use of it. Matters communiesated
orally cannot be proven;they can bo denied by us in
Geneva.
In January 1934, with defendant Jodl present,, the Oounoil planned a
mobilization, calendar and mobilization order for some 240,000 in
dustrial plants. Again it was agreed that nothing should be in writ
ing so that "the military purpose may not be traceable,
On May 21, 1933 the top secret Reich Defense Law was enacted.
Defendant Sshacht was appointed Plenipotentiary General for \7ar
Soonomy with the of secretly preparing all economic forces for
war and, lui the event of mobilization, of finanaipg the
Sohacht's secret efforts were supplemented in October 1936 by the
appointment of defendant Goering as Commissioner of the Four-Year
Plan, with the duty of putting the entire economy in a state of
readiness for war within four years,
A secret program for the accumulation of the raw materials
and foreign credits necessary for extensive rearmament was also set
ui foot immediately upon seizure of power* In September of
J-- -17-
1954 tlio Minister ot Soonoiiiics \rc.s alreadjr complaitiiiig that
"The taslc of stoelcpilisg is being hampered by the
laolc of foreign currency; the need for secrecy anc
camouflage also is a .retarding Influence,"(/
Foreign currency controls v^xe at once established* '^^ ^^- Financing
,i*„
was delegated to the wizard Sohaolit, vho conjured up the JiBFO Bill
to serve the dual' objectives of tapping the short-term money market
for rearmament purposes while concealing the amount of phese ex-
penditures, .
The spirit of the whole Nazi administration was summed up by
Goering at a meeting of the Council of i!iiiisters, which included
f
Schacht, on 27 May 1936, when he said,
point of an assured waging of v/ar."^'^^)
The General Staff, of course, also had to be enlisted in
the mx plans, ,]}.'jbst of the Generals, attracted by the phospeot of
rebuilding their armies, became willing accomplices. The hold-over
Minister of War von Blomberg and the Chief of Staff General von
Fritsoh, hov/ever, were not cordial to the increasingly belligerent
policy of thp Hitler regime, and by vicious and obscene plotting
/ 7Q \
they were discredited and removed :.n January 1958' Thereupon,
Hitler assumed for himself Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,
and the positions of von Blomberg and von Fritsch were filled by
. :.i 1
"All measui'es are to be considered :^rpm the stand- •" n.VI'
others .who became, as Blomberg said of Keitel, "a willing tool in
Hitler's hands for every one of his decisions,"The Generals
did not confine their participation to merely military matters.
They participated in all major diplomatic and political maneuvers,
such as the Obersalzburg meeting where Hitler, flanked by Keitel
(SI)
and other, top Generals, issued his virtual ultimatum to Schuschnigg,
As early as November 5, 1937, the plan to attack had begun
^ i
to take definiteness as to time and victim. In a meeting v/hich
included defendants Raeder, Goering, and von Neurath, Hitler stated
the cynical objective:
"The question for Germany is wher© the greatest
possible conquest could be iiiade at the lowest
possible Gostt'/
-13-.
dioouosed vaa^iouvs plans fox the invasion of Austria snd GzechO'-^^
slovalcia, iu.iicating clearly that he was thinking of these terri-
_ ories n-Ot ends in themselves, hut as means for fuytjier conquest,
lie pointed cut that considerably military and political assistance
would be afforded by possession o'" these lands and discussed the
possibility of cr^T.-.stituting from them nev^ armies up to "a strength
of about 12 divisions. The aim he stated boldly and baldly as the
acquisition of additional living space in Europe, and recognized
that "The German question can be ^f.^olved only by way of foro,e,"^^ '^
Six monthr later, emboldened by the bloodless Austrian con
quest, Hitler, in a secret directive to Keitel,, stated his "un
alterable declF.ion to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in ' •
the near future."(S3) Qn the sau.e^ day, lodl noted in his diary
that the Fuehrer had stated his final decision to destroy Czecho
slovakia soon and had initiated liiilitary preparations all along the
line, '^^ ^) By April the plan had heen perfected to attack Czecho
slovakia "with lightning swift £\ction as the result of an 'inci
dent
All along the line preparations becaine more definite for a
war of expansion, on tho assuinptlm that it would result in world
wide conflict. In Sentei/iber 1938 Admiral Carls officially commented
on a "Draft Study of Naval '/arfare Against Englandfj
"There is full agreement with the main theme of the
study.
"1. If according to the Fuehrer's decision Germany
is to acquire a position as a world power, she needs
not only sufficient oolonial possessions but also
secure naval oommunioations and secure access to the
ocean» '
/
"S, Both requirements can -nly be fulfilled'in
opposition to Anglo-^French ...nterests and will ILmlt
their position as \rarld powers. It is unlikely
that they can be achieved by peaceful means. The
decision to make Germany a v/orld pov/er therefore
forces upon us the necessity of making the corres
ponding preparations for wap.
> '«>_ '. ^ '',r .• >A-1 •
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"3. '-/ar. againat 'ilngland means at the same tirae war
against the Empire, against Ersnce, probahlj^ against
Russia as well, and a large nuxaber of countries over
seas; in fa0t^ against one-half to one-third of the -
v/hole world.
"It can only be justified and have a ohanc-e of success
if it is prepared econoinioally as well as politically
and militarily and waged vdth the aim of conquering
for Germany an outlet to the ocean."(QS)
. This Tribunal knov/s what categorical assurances were given
to an alarmed v/orld after the hnsohluss, after llinlch, and after
the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, that German ambitions were
realis and that Hitler had "no further territorial demands to
make in Europe.**'®'^ ' The record of this trial shows that those
promises were calculated deceptions and that those high In the
bloody brotherhood of Nazidom laie\: it.
As early as April 15, 1938 Goering pointed out to Mussolini
and Ciano that tiiQ possession of those territories vrould make pos
sible an attack on Poland. (88) Ribbentrop wrote on August S6, 1938
that
"After the liquidation of the Czecboslovakian
question, it vdll be generally assumed, that Poland
will be next in turn,"
V','.
••/v'via
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Eitlor, after the Polish invasion, boasted that it was the Austrian
and Czechoslovakian triumphs by which "the basis for the action
against Poland was laid,"'^^' Goering suited the act to the pur
pose and gave irmaediate inoti*uctions to exploit for the further
strengthening of Germany the war potential, first of the Siadeten-
land, and then of the whole Protectorate,!^^)
By May of 1939 the Nazi preparations, had riponed to the >
point that Eitler confided to defendants Goering, Raeder, Keltel,
and others, his readiness "to attack Poland at the first suitable
opportunity," even though he recognized that "further successes
cannot be attained without the shedding of blood." The larcenous
motives behind this decision he made plain in words that echoed • '
•-:''yhrM
mm
y.- • 'j.
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the covetous theme of KAMPF:"
"Circumstances must be adapted to aims. This is
impossible without invasion of foreign states or
attacks upon foreign property. Living spaee, in
proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the
basis of all power - further successes cannot be
attained without expanding our living space in the
East ..."(92)
Wliile a credulous world sluiiibered, snugly blanketed with
perfidious assurances of peaceful intentions, the Nazis prepared
not merely as before for £ war, but now for the war. The defendants
Gearing, Keitle, Raeder, Frick, and Funk, v/ith others, met as
the Reich Defense Council in June of 1939, The minutes, authen
ticated by Goering, are revealing evidence of the way in v/hich
each step of Nazi planning dovetailed vath every other. These five
key defendants, three months befoi''e the first panzer unit had knifed
into Poland, were laying plans for "employment of the population
in wartime," and had gone so far as to classify industry for
priority in labor supply "after five million servicemen' had been
called up," They decided upon measures to avoid "confusion when
mobilization takes place," and declared a purpose "to gain and
luaintaiii the lead in the decisive initial weeks of a war," They
then planned to use in production prisoners of var, criminal
prisoners, and concentration camp inmates. They then decided on
"compulsory v/ork for women in wartime." They had already passed
on applications frora 1,172,000 specialist workmen for classifica
tion as Indispensable, and had approved 727,000 of them. They
boasted that orders to workers to report for duty "are ready and
tied up in bundles at the labor offices." And they resolved to
increase the industrial manpov/er a-.pply by bringing into Germany
"hundreds of thousands of workers" from the Protectorate to be
f 93)
"housed together in hutments."
It is the minutes of this significant conclave of many key
defendants which disclose how the plan to start the war was coupled
-Sl-
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vTith the plan to vmge the war thr^ gh the use of illegal sources of
labor to maintain production. Hitler, in announcing his plan to
attack Poland, had already foreshadowed the sla^e labor program as
one of its corollaries when he cryptically pointed out to defendants
Goering, Raoder, Koitel, and others that the Polish population "v/ill
be available as a source of labor.This was the part of the
plan made good by Frank, who, as Governor General notified Goering
that he would supply "at least one million male and female agricultu
ral and industrial workers to the Reich,"'and by Sauokel=^ whose
imprGssment^^^°/^^°^"'^ occupied territory aggregated nuxabers equal to
the total population of some of the smaller nations of Europe,
Here also comes to the surface the link betvj-een war labor and
concentration camps, a manpower source that was increasingly used and
v/lth increasing cruelty. An agreement between Himmler and the IHnis-
ter of lusticG Thierack in 1942 pr-^vided for "the delivery of anti
social elements from the execution of their sentence to the Reiohs
Fuehrer SS to be worked to death,' An SS directive provided that
( Q7 1bedridden prisoners be drafted for work to be performed in bed.^ '
The Gestapo ordered 45„000 lews arrested to Increase the "rocruitisent
of manpower into the concentration camps,One hundred thousand
f 991
lows wore brought from Hungary to augment the can^s* manpower,^ '
On the initiative of the defendant Doenits, concentration camp labor
was used in the construction of submarines,ConcentratloE coughs
were thus geared into war production on the one hand, and into the
administration of justice and the political aims of the Nazis on
the other.
The use of prisoner-of-war labor as here planned also grew
with German needs. At a time when every German soldier was needed at
the front and forces were not available at home, Russian prisoners of
war were forced to man anti-airoraXt guns against Allied planes.
Field Marshal Milch reflected the Nazi merriment at this flagrant
violation of International Law, saying,
",,,This is an amusing thing, that the Russians
must work the
.w.ni
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•The orders for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of \jqt vrere so
ruthless that ^dmiral Canaris^ pointing out that they vrould "result
I
in arbitrary mistreatments and killings," protested to the OKW
against them as breaches of International Law, The reply of Keitel
was unambiguous:
"The objoctions arise from the military conception
of chivalrous warfare I This is the destruction of • - '
an ideology! Therefore, I approve and back the
measures^"VlOS3
The Geneva Convention would have been throv.n overboard openly
except that lodl objected be'dause he wanted the benefits of Allied
observance- of it while it v/as 3.'.ot being allowed to hamper the
Germans in any wayf(^*^3) ,
Other crimes in the 'conduct of warfare were planned with
equal thoroughness as a means of insuring the victory of German arms.
In.October 1938, almost a year before the start of the war, the
large-scale violation of the established rules of v^rarfare v/as oon-
Jv templated as a policy, and the Supreme Command circulated a Most
Secret list of devioupii explanations to be given by the Propaganda
' /
Minister in'Such oases, Even before this time commanders of
y
the armed forces were instructed to employ any means of warfare so
long as It facilitated victory, After the War v/as in progress
the ordfers increased in savagery. A typical Keitel order, demand
ing use ,of the "xnost brutal means," provided that
"...It IS the duty of the troops to use all means
\/ithout restriction, even against women and children,
so long as it Insures success,
^ The German Naval forces v/ere no Biore Imiaune from the in
fection than the land forces. Raeder ordered violations of the
I
accepted rules of warfare wherever necessary to gain strategic
survivox's of torpedoed eneroy ships in order to cripple xaerdiant
shipping of the Allied nations by deeimating their crews.(108)
successes. 5 Doenita urged his submarine crews not to rescue
.Vvi'.'- '•^•'''•1
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Tb.us, the war crimes agai*nst Allied forces and the crimes
against huifianity comraitted in occupied territories are inoontestahly
part of the program of making the war "because, in the German cal
culations, they were indispensable to its hope of success.
Similarly, the whole group of pre-war crimes, including the
persecutions within Germany, fall into place.around the plan for
aggressive v,ar like stones in a finely -Arcought mosaic. . Novfhere
is the v-rhole catalogue of crimes of hazi oppression and terrorism
within German so v/ell integrated v/ith the. crime of war as in that
strange mixture of v/ind and wisdom v/hich makes up the testimony
of Hermann Goering, In describing the airms of the Nazi program
before the seizure of power, Goering said:
•'The first question .was to achie-^e and establish a
different political structure for Germany which would
enable Geimiany to obtain against the Dictate (of
Versailles), and not only a protest, but an objection
ri-f' onrxh fa A -if. wnnlrl pnl-.nanv hfi p.rj-n cs-? /of such a nature that it ould actually be co sidered.
With these purposes, Goering admitted that the plan was made to
overthrow the Weiraar Republic, to seize povrer, and to carry out
the Nazi program by v/hatever means vrere necessary, whether legal
(110)
or illegal®
From. Goering's cross-examination we learn how necessarily \
the whole program of crime follov/ed, Because they considered
a strong state necessary to get rid of the Versailles Treaty, they
adopted the fuehrerprinzip®' Having seized power, the Nazis thought
it necessary to protect it by abolishing parliamentary government
(1X2)
and suppressing all organized opposition from political parties.
This was reflected in the Goering that the oper^ was
more important than the Reiohstag.Even the "opposition of
each individual person vbs not tolerated unless it was a matter
of unimportance," To insure the suppression of opposition a
secret political police was necessary. In order to eliminate in
corrigible opponents, it was necessary to establish concentration
iiihii 11 'i" .•
w ••
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. oamps a^d to i^esort to the devicS' of protestive custody. Pioteotlve
custody, Goerln^ testified, meant that
"people were •arrested and taken into protectiv^e
. custody who had • ccmniittod no crime but who one
might "expect, if they remained in freedom, would Miai
•do all sorts of things to damage the German State."
The same purpose was dominant in the persecution of the Te^vs,
In the beginning, fanaticism and political opportunism played s
principaj. part, for anti-seniitism and its allied scapegoat
mythology v/as a vehicle on v/hich the Nazis rode to poxver. It was
for this reason that the filthy Streicher and the hlashpemous "
Rosenberg were welcomed to a place at Party rallies and made
leaders and officials of the State, or Party. But the Nazis soon
regarded the Jews as foremost amongst the opposition to the
police state with which they planned to put forv/ard their plans
of iriilitary aggression. Pear'of their pacificism and their
opposition to strident nationalism was given as the reason that
the Jews had to be driven from the political and economic life of
Germany.Accordingly, they were transported like cattle to
the concentration camps, v/here they were utilized as a source of
forced labor for war purposes.
At a meeting held on 12 Novenxber 1938, tv/o days after the
violent anti-Jewish pogroms instigated by Goebbels and carried
out by the Party Leadership Corps and the SA, the program for the
elimination of the Jev;s from the German economy was mapped out by
Goering, Funk, Eeydrlch, Goebbele, and other top Nazis. The
measures adopted included confinem-^nt of the Jews in ghettos, out-
ting aff their food supply, "aryanising" their shops, and re
stricting their freedom of movement^ Here another puipose
behind the Jewish persecufeionLS crept in, for it v/as the wholesale
eonfIscation of their property which helped finance German, rearma
ment. Although Schacht^s plan to have foreign money ranssom the
Bntire race wltjiln Germany was not adopted, the Jews were stripped
• i-^h
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to. the, point v/here. Gtoering was able to advise the Reich Defense
Council that, the csritioal situation of the Reich exchequer, due
to rearmament, had been relieved "through the billion Reichsmark
fine inposed'on Jewry,-and through profits accrued to the Reich
in the aryanization of Jewish enterprises.^
j
A glance over the dock will show that^ despite quarrels among
themselves, each defendant played a part which fitted in mth every
other, and that all advanced the common plan. It contradicts ex
perience that men of such diverse backgrounds and talents should
so forward each other's airas by coincidence.
The large and varied role of Goering was half militarist
and half gangster. He stuck a pudgy finger in every, pie. He used
his SA musolemen to help bring the gang into power. In order to
entrench that pov/er he'contrived to have the Reichstag burned,
established the Gestapo, andcreated the concentration cariips. He
was equally adept at massacring opponents and at framing scandals
to get rid of stubborn generals. He built up the Luftv/affe and
hurled it at his defenseless neighbors. He was among the foremost
in harrying the Jews out of the land. By mobilizing the total
economic resources of Germany he liiade possible the v^aging of the-
war v/hlch he had taken a large part in planning. He v/as, next to
litler, the man v/ho tied the activities of all the defendants to
gether in a common effort.
The parts played by the other defendants, although less com
prehensive and less spectacular than that of the Relchsmarshal, were
nevertheless integral and necessary contributions to the joint under
taking, \,dthout any on© of •which' the success of the common enter
prise v/ould have been in jeopardy. There are'many specific deeds
of which these men have been proven guilty. No purpose would be
served — nor indeed is time available — to review ^i the cririies
I nil I I Mil rty^i 1mIIiii'it kMii'm li ti<ili
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v/liieli the evidence has charged up to their names. Nevertheless,
im viewing the ocnspiracy as a whole and as an operating mechanism
it may be v/ell to recall briefly the outstanding services v/hich
each of the men in the dock rendered to the common cause.
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Ths- zealot IiESSj befbre succumbing to'-ws'iid.erl-ustj. y^as the engineer
• ' * * • .tending •the I'f.rty iiF.ciiiner^-j, pacs ,orders and pi'Opaganda dovm to the Leader-.
ship Corpsj, su|)ernn.sing every aspect of .Party activities, and maintaining the
orgarasatioh as a loyal and reacy tnstruiient of pover. then apprehensions
abroad tha-eate.ned the success of the-Nasi scheme for conquest, it was the
/
dtiylicitous .iibbentrap, the aalesman of deception, who was detailed to. pour
vine on the trouijled watei's of suspicion by preaching "the gospel, of llmii.te'd . ,
and peaceful intentions. rilTbL, weak and willing tool, delivered the armed
forces/the i:-\struinent of degression, over to the Party and directed them in '
i
executing itsfelonous designs.
the gmid iixq.yic:- -up took up the bloody mantle of
\
Heydrich,to'stifle opiiosition aji-i te.rroi.d.ie coiupliance, and buttressed the
,n;' porer of Hational Sociaiism on a fovmdation 'of guUtless corpses. It was
, POSSt"!f3LUa, the intellectual high priest of the "master race/' who provided
the doctrine of hatred wliich gave the ini^ietuf for the annihilation of Jewr^r,
and put his infijel theories into practice against the eertei-n occunied terri
tories, His v/o<jly philosc'-diy also addec." boredom to the long list of Kazi
atrocities, ilie fanatical FRAJ'K, v/ho solidified Nazi •control ,by establishing •
the nev/ order of authority without law, o that the; will of the'Party was the '
onl;)!' test of legality, pi-oceeded to. export his lawlessness to Poland, ydyich
he governed with the lash of Caesar and .-iiose population he reduced to 'sorrowdng
remnants* PRICK, the ruthless organizer, helped tlie Party to seise pov/er,
super*vd.sed the police agencies to, insure tlvit it stayed in pcr.ver, and chained
the economy of Pohemia and Kbravia to the Oemian v^ar machine.
STiiEIC^-lE7i', the venomous vulgarirn, manufact'ir-ed a)^d distributed obscene
racial libels v^iich iiicited the populace to accept'and assist tlie progressively
sava(;e operations of "race pui'ification." As ^'ir/ster of Economcs FITHK
: •%
accelerated the pace of rearmiament, and As I"ieiohsbank president ba.nked for ' >•
the GS the gold teeth fillings of concentration camp victims — probably the
most ghoulish collateral in banking liistory* It ms SCIiACRT, the -facade of
' " • ' ' ••••••'"Sistarcried reapectability, -smo in the earl-y days pro-yided the wind,ow drv^ssjng,
r.'
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the bait for the hesitant, and .rhos© wisardiy later mde i-^ possible for Hitler
:x'-'
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. tp finance the colossal resroSLiiqiit prog.ivMp and to do it^secretlyv
DCEIII'TZ, Hitler's legatee of defeat, nronot'ed the success of the liasi
agr;ressions hy instructiiig his pack of suU'.ia.rine killers to conduct V/arfare
at. sea the illegal fei-ocitj^ of the ^ Ji-.gle. rtilEDEiu the political admixal,
stealtliilp- built up the Ceman nayy ir. defiance of^ Hio Versaille's Ti^eaty^ and
• I
then put it to use in a series o£ aggressions T:hich he had tal:en a large part
in planning. VOl'j SCHIRACIIj poisoner of a gcneratiorij jnitiated the Goi-man
youth in Ib.si doctrinG, trained theiii in egions for service in the SS and
i
"ehrmacht, and delivered diern up to -the x'arty as fanalicj unquestioning executors
' " '/ " "
of its v.-ill,,
SAUCICEL, the greatest and cruelc o slaver, since the Pharaohs of Egypt,
p:>roduced desperatejy rieeded manpower by -rivii-ig foreign peoples into the land
of jondar;e on 2li scale ^inlcnovvn even 1:-l the ancient days of tyranny in the
* /
kingdom of the Kile. JOEL, betrayer 'of the traditions of Ms profession, led
' . V
the Y/ehmacht in violating its ovm code . f militar^r honor in order- to carry
out tM bar-barous air.s of Pazi policy. 'iOf PiiPlTd, pious .ar.'ent of an infidel
..-egine, held the stirrup v/hlle Jiitler vaulted into tM saddle, lubricated
the AuciU'ian annexation, aid devoted his diplomatic cunning to the service
o.i hazi objectives abroad,
id' , SETSS-IMQLART, spearhead of the Austrian fifth-column, took over the
. • . - •
I '• government of ras ov<n country only to make a present of it to Hitler, and
then, rioving north, brought/terh-or and oTpression to the Netherlands and
py pillaged its econaiy for the benefit of no .Genaan juggernaut. VOtJ NL'U.'.iA'IB,
' / ' 'the' old-school diplom^.t, wM cost the peai-ls of his experience before Nazis,.
ijuidod Nazi di-plom^y in the early years, soothed the fears c.t prospective
1.
vici;ii:.s, and as .eioh Protector of Goiemia and ?Ioravia, strengthened the Genaan
position .for the coirdng attack on Poland. Sfiiht, as Hinistoir of Amamento
ar.'.3, ' ar Productiori, joined in planning and executing i;.he program to dragoon
prisoners of v;ar and foreign wod^ers ir' v.' Ger-dsn -. ar industiies, vnich'v.^xe-d
• in out.yut r.itile the laboi-ers waned M si- -rvation. FrjITSGKE,. radio propaganda '
.chief, by manipulation of the truth goaded G-ermn publj.c opinion into fienzied
' . support of the regime and. ^©sthetiaed the independent judgment of the popu-
^ lation so that they^414 vithoii^f question/.their masters' bidding. -..And SOltkAI-JN,
i'; /
•• V,
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•who has not accepted our invitation to this re-'onion, sat at the, throttle of the
\ ,
vast am poYferful engine of the Partv, guiding it in the ruthj.ess execution of
Nazi policies5 from the scourging' of'the Christian Ghux'ch to the'lynching of
captive Allied aiimien.
The activities of -all these defendants, despite their varied backgro'imds
and talents, ^.vere joined v.ith the effort's of other conspirators not now in the
dock, T;ho played still other essential roles. They blend together into one
consistent ^and militant pattern aninated by a common objective to reshape the
•.mp of Eur'ope by force of anus. Some of these defendants v.-ere ardent members •
of the Nazi movement from its birth. Others, less faraatical, joined the common
enterprise later, after successes had made pa?::ticipation attractive by the
promise of reivards. This group of latter-day converts reuiedied a crucial defect
in the ranks of the original true believers, for as hr. Seiciers has pointed out
in his siomraation s
"...There were no specialists among the National Socialists
for.the particular tasks, host of the National Socialist
collaborators did not previously fillow a trade requiring
technical education.
It was the fatal wealmess of the early Nazi band that it lacked technical com
petence. It could not from among its own ranks malce up a government capable
of carrying out all the projects necessar^r to realize its abas, TT'icreln lies
the special crime and betrayal of men like Schacht and von Neurath, Speer and
von Papen, Raeder aid ^Doenitz, Keitel and Jodl. It is doubtful riiether the
Nazi master plan could have siocceeded \'mthout their specialised intelligence
viuch they so vrilTingly put at its conraand. They did so with kno-rledge
of its announced aims and methods, and continued their services after practice
had coni'inned the direction in nhich they were tending. Their .superiority to
the average run of Nazi mediocrity is not their excuse. It is their condemnation.
The dominant fact which stands out' from all the thousands of pages of
the record of this trial is tliat the central crime of the wiiole group of Nazi
crimes — the attack on the peace of the world — was clearly and deliberately
planned. Tbe beginning of these wars of egression was not an unprepared and
spontaneous springing to arms by a population- excited by saie current indigna
tion. Aweek before tlie invasion of Poland Hitler told his military commanders:
"•VS
•-m
8^^-;
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'"I-.'shall ,.giv^ a propagandist cause for starting -war — never
mind v/hetlier it be• plausilxLe or not. The victor shall not be
asked later on v^hether -we told the., truth or not. In'starting
and rcalcing a v.a.r, not the right is v/hat inatters^ but victory."
The propagandist incident, v/as duly provided by dressing concentration camp •
inmates in Polish uniforms, in order to create the appearance of a Polish
> . •
attack on a'Geman frontier radio station.The plan to occupy Belgium,
Holland, and' Luxembourg fia\st appeared as early, as Ai:igust 193& in corinection
with the plan for attack on Czechoslovalcia#The intention to attack
became a program in May 1939? Hitler told his commanders that -
"The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed
forces., Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.
Thus, the follow-up wars were plained before the first was launched. These
v/ere the- most carefully plotted wars .in all history. Scarcely a step in their
terrifying succession and progress failed to move according to tlie master
rblueprint or the subsidiary schedules and timetables until long after the crimes
• of aggression vrere consummated.
Nor were' the war crimes and the crimes against humanity unplanned, |
! \
isolated, or spon-fcaneous offenses. Asi;'/.-. frcm our undeniable evidence of their
plotting, it is sufficient to ask whether sir: million people could be separated
from the population of several nations-on the basis of their blood and birth,
could be destroyed and their bodies disposed- of, 'except that the operation
fitted into the general scheme of govemr..ent. Could the enslavement of five
millions of laborers, their impressment into service, their transportation to
I
Germany, their allocation to work whore they ivould be most useful, their
_jiiaintenance, if slow starvation can be called maintenance, and their guarding
have been accomplished if .it did not fit into ths common plan? Could hundreds
of concentration ca^ips located throughput Germany, built to accommodate hundreds'
of thousands of victims, and each requiring labor and materials for construction,
manpower to operate and supervise^ and close gearing into the econony — could >
such efforts have been expended under German autocracy if they had not suited
the planV'r Has ihe Teutonic passion for organization become famous for its
i / '
toleration of non-oon.forming activity? Each part of the plan fitted into
every other. Tne slave labor- program meshed with the needs of industry and
rj..v.,ks-
(i
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ag^'icAU.tiire, and these :lri turn c:j'Tichroni^',ed rrith the rnilitr...'T machine, 'ihe
elcborate propaganda apparatus geared ndth the program to doninabe the people
and in.cj.te them to a vrar their sons ivoulcl have to fight. The anna-nent m-iius-
tries vrere .fed by the co/jcentration ccrips. Tne concentration camps fed
by the Gestapo. The Gestai-X) -vvas fed by tlie spy system of the Nazi iarty^
Nothing vras peiritted under the Nazi iron inile that vras not in accordance vri.th
the program. Everi'"thl[ig of consequence that took place in this regir.:ented
society "VTas but a r-anifestation of a premecbLtated and unfolding purpose to
secure the Nazi state a place in tlie sun by casting all otjiers Into daitcneES.
CCi:n,':0.iM DEFLNSPjS against '.PHE CiiARGE Oi'
GOif :ge REsrO:: Sii3ii.i ty
Ti-ie defendants meet this oveindieln-dng case^ sa.ic by admitting a lirdted
responsibility, (l^ij) by puttiiig the blame on others, (1^5) ^nd some by
taking the position, in effect, that vdiile there have been enorrriGUo crimes
lliero are no criminals. Time -yvill not penait me to examine each Individual
and peculiar defence, but there are certain lines of defense comraon to so many
cavscs tmt they deserve some consideration.
Counsel .for riiany o.c the defendants seek to dismiss the conspiracy or
coniiion planning cliai'ge on the grour.-^ that the pattern of the Nazi plan doo-s
not fit the conce;pt of cons;'"'iracy aydicable in Germa.n lap; to the plottlrr of
a highway robbeiy or a •jT.irglar^''. Bieir concept of conspira.cy is in the
terms of a steadthy iaeetjng in tTie dead of night, in a secluded hi.ieout, in
of felons
whic;:- a group / plot every detail of a specific crime. uie Oinirter forestalls
resort to s\ich ijarochial and narro-7 concepts of conspi.-ac7 taken from local
law by usicfj tiie additional and non-tcchnrlcal teriii, "cairion plan." Omitting
entirely the alternative tern of "conspiracy," the Charter read.s that "leaders,
organizers, instigators, and accomplices participatiig in the forrmC.ation or
execution of a comon plan to ccmit" anj''" of the described crimes "are respon
sible for ell acbe performed by any persons ii execution o.f" such
Tl*ie Ghart&j;- concept of a comiiion plan really represents the conspiracy
pr:?XiCip.le in an intsmational context, A common plan or consoiracy to seize
the machinery of a state, to commit, criviies agairist -bhe peace of the v.'Oild, to
H^liiintiifllnir I'l.iaali'lirtl'irr
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"'b3.ot a race out'of -existence,,'-to en.slave milland to cubjut'ate anc. loot
•piiole nations cannot be thought of in the same terras as the plotting of petty
crimes, although tire sane underlying nrinciples are c-i-plicablo. Little gang
sters i.iay plan which v."!!! carr," a pis'tol anc 'vvhich a. s'lrletto, who will
ar>pros,ch a •victim from tlie front 'and Tjho from, behind, and Miere they "i-dll i^ay-
Isy iiin. Dut in planning a v/ar "die pistol becaiias a Vfehrmacht, the stiletto
, a L^uftvaffe, inrere -Ix) stril-we is not a choice-of dark alleys, bu!. a iiiatter of
vcrld geogranhy# The ooeratiou in-volvcs tno manipul.stion of public opinion,
the lav of t'ne state, the pol'ice povver, industry, ciid finance, ihe baits and
bluffs -must bo translated tntn a nation's .foreign policy. Likev.dse, the degree
\
of stealth V'hich noints to a guilty purpose in a conspimcy anil depend upon
its object. Tlie cland-estine preparations of a staive ajgainst international
socieiy, although ca]aou:Llaged to those abroa;:., might be quite opeii aiic. notorious
among its ovn people. But stealth is not an essential ingredient of such
planning. Parts of the common plan may be ^.r-oclaimcd from the housetops, as
anti-Seiaitn.s'Oi vas, and parts of it kept undercover, o.r, rearasincnt for a long
tirae vras. 'It is a net ten of strategy ho-.- much of the preparation slaall bo
made public, as was G-oeririg's annonncenent in 193o of 'the creation of an air
force, and how muoh shall be kept covert, as in. the case of 'the hazis' use of
(12?)
shovBj.s to teach "labor corps" the in3,nual ams.^ hne forms of thij
grand type of conspiracy are a-ji.orphous, ^iic mo^vnc are oppor'tunistic, an^.i
neither can -.tivcrt the ?_aw .from getting at tiie vsubsta^ice of t]-iinyo.
IItg defendants contend, Ixuvevor, that there coi-0.d be no consraracy in
volving aggressive rar because (l) none of "the basis vrantod war^ (2) re-
annr-r^nt was o;aly intended to provide the streng-th to :nii}:e Cerricny's voice
tBard in the family of natims; and (3) the wars v.ere not in fact
aggressive v/aa-s but ivere defensive against a "Bolshevik menace,
V-l'ien we analyse the argument tlv-it the Kazi.s did not wai'it war it comes
down, iri suns-to this? "The recoadl. looks'bad indeed — objectively —
bui. vhen you consider the state of ray mirid — subjec tive'jy I hated vrar, I kne^j
•the horrors of war. X wanted peace." I am not so sure of ttiis, I am even
less v/illbo'' to accepi' Ooering's descri-jtion of tire General Staff as paoi-
Hcr.'.'evt^-r, it will not injire our case to admit that as an abst>-^act
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pro'Dosition none or "these ."lefendents liked ISut the;/" v.^nted tinLngs
'd-iich. they knev. "they couj-d not get -v7i"tl-iout "vvar. Tney n-sjited their neighbors'
lends and goods. Their philosophy seems to be that if tlis neighbors v/ovld not
acquioscej then they ai-e tlie aggressors ana are to olame for "tlie v,ar. The
fact is, hon'ever, that \rd.i- never became terrible to the Naois "until it caiTie
hoiiie to them, matil it eioposed their dccepti\-e assurances to the dermian "people
tlaat r,erma.n ci"tios, like the riiined one in v.hich vre meet, r,"Ould be Invulnerable,
From then on v/ai' v/as terrible.
But agai:i the defendants claii, "To be sure rre vrere b"ui3.ding gmis.
Bui; not to slioot. They r/cre only uo give us v,eight iri negotiatirv:." At its
best tliis argurnent anounts to a conteaition that the i.i:aita:y forces v/ere
intended for blacio.ia.il, not for battle. The threai". of militant" invasion vhich
forced the Austsrian /jisdil-^iss, "tiie threats %-fhdch pceceded h.unich, and loeririg's
threat to bo.;.b "the beautiful ci'ty of Prague if "bhe Pi-esident of Czechoslovakia
did not consent to thf; Protectorate, are exaraples of v-rhmt "bhe defendants
iiave in mind rdier; "they tall^'of arming "bo bacii negotiation.
i3ut :i?ro:v. "the very nature of Geman demands, the day nas bound to
come vdien some country nould refuse to buy its peace, vrauld refuse to pay
Dene-geld, —
"For the end of tiiat game is oppression and shame,
Pxid the nation that plays it is lost."
Did these defendants then intend to ?dthdraiY German demands, or v;as
Germany to enforce them and liianrpulat/e propaganda so as oo place uiie blarue xor
the var on the .cation so unreasona^ble as to resis'b? Dvents iiave ansv/ered that
question, and documontr such as Adraxral Carl's momoraniium, oai-lier quoted,
leave no doubt that the events rcc!.irred as anticipa"bod.
But some of tbie defendants argue tf^t the mrs '-e.re not aggressive
and vfere only ir'jtendcd to protect Germany against some Cvenbual danger Irom
"bTe ""^xsnace of Comnunism," vhich "i7a.s sc"lCtaiing of an oosession "v-itn many Nazis.
At the outset i.his argument of self-dafense falls because it completely
i^cnores this dai.ning coiXJlnation of facts clearly es'fcablished in the record:
first, "bk.: enormous aard rapid German preparations for ivar; second, the repeatedly
avo?/ed intentions of tlie German leaders to attack, wiich I ha,ve previously
I ii - I I I i"^ir"i ntr'i •• ti^ci hi • -- —» ---m i ibii n i li
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C3.t'-:0.t 3iiC. t!,ird.j tiie f;ict that a seizes of v/ars occva-rcd in ".:hich Gerr.ian forces
strynl: the first blo-^rs^ v;itlioiit v/arninKj across the borders of other nations.
Er/en if it conld be shovni Tiiicli it cannot be — that the .^rassian
Tfar TTaS really defensive^j such is denonstrably not the case vd.th those iTars
which preceded it.
It •n.av slsG be pointed out tha-t even those v-ho would have you believe
tlict Gerpary was menaced by ComiViunisra also compete v.lth each oilier in descilbing
their opposition to tlie disastrous iussian -venture.Is it reasonable
tint thev would h?.ve opposed that ivar if it wcrc^ underta]-:en in good faith self-
defense?
Tlie frivolous character of tlie self-defe/ise theo.ry on the facts it
is sought to conpencatej as advocates often do, hy resort to a thieor^,' of law.
"Dr. Jahrrciss, in his sch.olai'ly argument- for the defense, idghtl;/' jioints out
that no treaty provisioji anl no priicipj.e of law denied Geimany, as a sovereign
nation, the right of self-defense. Ke follows v.ith hie assertion, for rhich
there is authoiity in classic International Law, that
everj'' state is alone juf^.ge of whetlper in a given case
it is a iw.r of self-defense."
It is noi. ncijcesoary to e;.-.ariYlne the validity of an abstract principle which
dors not ap:ily to the :tacts of our case. I do not doubt that if a nation
arr'iv'id. at a tlia.t it must resort to i^r in self-defense, because of
conditiono affording reasonaole grounds for such an honest gudcment, any
Triburu-il v^o-ald acco;vi ±1 great and y)erhaps ccnclnsive v/eig]it, even if later
events proved t^iat judfjnent mistai-ren,
I:Sut die facts in this case call for no such defeiocnce to honest judg
ment because no such ju(l!('ment was even pretended, much less honestly made.
in all t;ie documents which disclose the planning and rationalisation
of these att/acks, nob one sontonee has been or can be cited, to show a good
faj.th fear of attacic. It 3/iay be tliat statesmen of otne.:' natiens lacked the
cou.ra/<e forUiriphtXy and fully to disarm. Pei-iiaps tliey s-aspectsd the secret
rcarraannnt of t-err^any. but if tlie^r hesitateu to abandai arms, they
did not hesitate to "ieilect thecn Gerr:ia:iy va~11 knew tlmt her forme-r enemies
had a3.1oweo their aiiiaju-nts to fall into decay, so little did they contej-iplate
ir^rtfiiiiiii 'iiiiiiii.iiitfriiiilii'
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anotlTcr v/ar. . Ger^iiany faced a Europe that not only;-was ui-v/ij.ling to attack,
but v/ae too Yjeak and pacifist even adequately to defend, and -.-fent to the very-
verge of dishonor, if not, be '^-cnG, •to buy its peace» The minutes^ we have shown
you of tlie Nazis' secret conclaves identify no potential attacker. They bristle
vdth the spirit of aggression and not of defense. Tney contemplate alv.'ays
1 '.
territorial expansion, not t;.e maintenance of territorial integri'i^'-.
Minister of ""ai- von Blomberg, iii liis 1937 directive prescribing general
principles for txie preparation for war of the arried forces, has given the lie
.to these feeble claims of self-defense. Re stated at tiiat time:
"'The general political sl-tuation justifies tiis supposi'oion
that Germany need not consid.er an attack on any side. Grounds
for this are, in addition to tlie lack of desire for war in ^
almost all nations, particularly the ';estem Porjors, the
deficiencies in t>ie preparedness for war .in a number of states
and of Hiassih in particvJ.ai%"
%
iievorthcless, he recomjiended , • ' '
"a continuous prepar©(i!iee^ .1^3? mr hfi order to (a) counter
attack at any time, sxid (h) %o enabXe the mi?.i-ta?.y exploita
tion of .politically favorable oppoi'tvUii-uios should they
occur.
If these defendants my no*.v c^'nically plead self-defense, although
no good faith need of self-defonse was asserted or contemplated any respon
sible leader at the time, it reducei? non-aggression treacles to a legal
absurdi'ty* Iliby becaie only additional instrui-ients. of deception in the hands
of tho aggr^SBor, and traps for yrell-iaeajiing nations. If t!:ere be in non-
aggression pacts an implied conditics'i that each nation my make a'bona fide
jud;^;in0nt as to 'Uie necessity for self-defense against imminerjt threatejjed
attack, they certainly cannot be invoked to shelter -those viio never made any
such judgixnVt at all,
V * >
In opening this case I ventured to 'predict that tliere n-ould be no
serious denial that 'tlie crimes chargec v.'ore coiffipitted, and t^at tne Issiie
--.rouLd concern thn responsibil'itr/ of pra-ticular defendants. TIto. defendants
have fulfilled that prophecy. GerLerally, they do not depy that these things
hapoened, but it is contended ihat they "Just happened," and that they vrere , , ;
\ .. - •• •• '••-"••i'
hot the result of- a common plan or conspiracy. , , .•
' • • •
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Oiie of" the chief rear.pns .tlie cleierihsnt-c say tiicre Yvas fiO'conspiracy
- ' ' ' ' " (13 3)
is tiie ar'piment iiiat- conspiracy •Rfa's .mpossible r.-it-i a dictator. ihe
argu.-ner.t''runG-that they,all, had to obey Hitler's orders, nhiph 'nad the force
of law in the Geman* State, and'hence obedience cannci. be made trie basis Ox
a criminal cliarge, .In dois way it 'is exv^laine'd that while there i-iai.ve been
wholesale hillings, there have bcsen no nurderers.
This argui'ient is an effort- to evade Article 5 of the Ciiarter,' vnich
provi;.ies that the oi-der of tire government or of a superior shsl-l not free a
defon-Jnnt frov.i responsibility but csn only be considered in mitigation. >This
orovision of the Charter corresponds with the .iustice and vrith the realities
of tiie situation, as j.ndicated in defendant Hpeer's description of he
conslderc-A to be the corrmon bit the leaders of the Geri'ian nation:
"... -v.'ith reforerne to utterl;^r decisive matters, there is
total responsibility. Tlieji-e must be total responsibility
insofar as a person is one of the leaders, because who else _
could assume responsibility for the development of even'ts,
if not the nrnmedlate associates who wt>rk with and around
the head of the sta.te?"^^f"^
And again he told the Tribunal:
"... It is impossible after the catastrophe to evade this
total respoiisibility. If the war had been vJon» jthe leaders
woulo also liavo assumed total responsibility."^ ^
Liho much of defense counsel's abstract arguments, the contention
tliat tire absolute power of liltlor precluded a conspiracy crumbier: in face of
thn facts of record. Tt-ic Fuehr-e:rpringlj; of absolulism "vwis itself a part of
the comon pi'?''-, as Goeriaig has pointed out,^~^^^ 'fe ..lefendants may have
becoiae slaves of a dj.otator, tut he vfiis theli- dictator. To rishe him such was,
as Goermg has testi.fied, the object of the Tiasi movement from the beg.inning.
hvery Ilaai took this oath:
"I pledge eternal allegiance to Adol.f Hitler. I pledge
ui''Oond.itional obedience to him and the fuehrers appointed
by
poreover, they :forced evor^pbody else in tneir poY5;'r tal-re it. fhis oath
w"S il''''r.al iindei' German law, which ma.^e it criminal to become a member of an
organiKatior in v/'hcti obedienco to "imknown superiors c-r uricon'J.itionsl otiedience
to knoT/n is p3.e.i;;ed."( '^U) xi,eEe men destroyed free govr-rtrient in
Germai-r- and now plead to be excused from respoiisibiiity because they became
m
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slaves. They fxe in the position of. the ficticnai boy whosr.iirdered his father
and mother-.and 'th-eii pleaded.'fpr leniency- becatisc he v/as an orphan.
- • "tVhat "these raen have overlooked is that Adolf Mj.tler's acts are their
acts. It v/as these'men'among millions of others, and it 7,'as these men leading
millions of others, who built \ip Adolf Hitler and vested in his psychopathic
personality not only ihnuxdex'able lessor decisions but the supreme issue of
war or peace. They intoxicated him with power and adulation. They fed his
hates erA aroused his fears. They put a loaded gu-n in Ms eager hands. It
yr^s left to Hitler to pull the ti'igger, and when he did they all at that tiiae.
I
approved. His guilt stands adia.i.t'tr:d, by some defeiida^ts reluctantl.y, by some
vindic tive?_y. 3ut liis i.uilt is U'lo g-ailt of tAie Ydiole dock, and of ever;/ man
in it*
But it is "Lu^ged that the-se defenviantri- eiuuld r.ot be in agrcei-ient on a
comjaon plan or in a coi-spiracy because they were fighting among thomselves
I
or belonged to different factions or cliques. Of course, it is not necessar^r
"that'men should agre.e on cvei-yidiing in order to agree on enough things "to make
.them liable for a criminal conspiracy. Unquestionably there were conspiracies
v-rithi-n •the conspiracy, and intrigues and rivalries, and battles for power*
Sciiacht and (.'oerin:;- disagre-ed, but over which Of them should control the
economy, not over whether the economy should be regimented for war*^^^^
Goerlng clai^as to "have departed from the plan because through haiileiTis he
conducted some negotiations with men of influence in Zhgland ;just before the
Polish -war. But it is nerfoctl;'- clear that ti'iis was not an effort to prevent
aggression against Poland but to make that aggression succe.jsful and safe by
obtaining Snglish neutrality. Rosenberg and Goering may have had some
differences as to how stolen art shonld be .listribute.d hut they had none about
how it should be stelon* Jodl and Goebbels may 1-iave disag.'.^ed a'oout whether,
to denounce the Geneva Convention, but they nover oisagreed about violating
it* AsT so it goes through the whole:long and sornivt story, "j'Jowhere do v/e
find an instance vhere any c,Me of the defendants stood up against the rest and
said. Tills thing is wrong and I v.ill not go along with it* A"liere"*.er thej''
differed, their differences were as to meti'iod or disputes over j-.wisdiction.
i'i _ ' - •i-.,
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but alv/ays vr:.thin the fraiaework of the coir^on plan*
Some of the defendants alec chntend tnat in any event there.was no
conspiracy to coimait war crh '^.es or criises a-ed.nst Iruraanlty because cabinet
nei^ers never met nitli the mi3.itary to'pl^Hi thea# acts.- But these crimes were
orav the inevitable and inci'ienUl results of the plan to coimnt tlie afigres-
sion -or Lebensraum purposes. niUer stated, at a conference with his coimian-
— ^
ders, tliat
"liie main objective in Poland is the destructxon oi the (ihd)
eneruT and not the reacliins of a oertais geoGiranhical line."^
Fraifc picked up tho tune and sug-gestsd that ^:^n thei.r usefulness yias ex-.;
hausted,
"... then, for all I i?m be made of the
Poles and bKranians and aroisnd
here - .it docs not matter what
rieichBcomnn.sEar Koch in the irxraine ecl^d^ ^ refrain:
"I irill draw the very last out of ti^s country. 1 did not
. come to spread bliss.
This v-as Lebensraum on its seamy side. Could man of. theii' practical, iuuel-
ligence errjod:. to get neijjhborlng l.ands fre^- tne clai::is ox their texxants
yri-thout committiixg criaes against hur.ianiiy?
Tlie^last stcnd o:!' each de.feud<?.nt is that even if there v.as a con
spiracy, he was hot in it. It Is -tlierefore Important in exaxuinlng their
attempts at avoidance of responsibili* '^* bo khow, first ox all, ju-St x.fiiat it
is that a ccffispiracy chaxrge comprehen.fe and piftnioheb.
• In conspirac:r we do not punish on® for anothex- ms-n's crixne. We
seek -bo immish each for his ovii orim of |Oteilig a eoranon criminal plan in
which others also participated. Ttie uiGasixre of the crimin.ality of the plan
and therefore of the guilt of each participant is, of course, the sum total
of crl-aes committed by all in exocuting the plan. But the gist of the offense
is i-jarticipatlon in the form-alatio.n or exeoutioa of, the plan. These are imiles
Tdiich every society has found nacttseaiy in oj^ter to reach men, like these
defendants, who never get blood on tlr®ir ovm hrn^ls but lay plans that
result in- the nhexkling of blood. iU over today, in everj^ zone of
occupation, little men vbo darried out tiie<t? eripiinal policies under orders are
*
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beiiijv cc:n'viot£d sii6: i^imished. It v:ouLd present a vast and imTordiveable card-
ca'iT.c- rd juptlce df tde iiicn T;hQ nlanned the^e policies and directed those
I
little men shcud escape all penalty''.
9
These eicn jsi this dock,, on the dace o.f the ix-cord, were not stran^^ers
.1:0 Lhis pro^Pcn-; ol criine^ noi- v^as iii.eir conneetian \'dth it i^ijsete or obsciu'e.
';e i'iad theiu ij> the vq-ty heai-'t of it*. 'IS-ie peeitdous the^ jXiild. cKcpt that v,-e
iTa.Ve chosen defendants of sell-eviderit responslbllil^:-, Tl^y are the very too
' smynam-: s.uthorlties in their respective fields aixi in the ;^azi Sta.le, ICo
v
one lives ivhc. at leadt -orvtil tlio very la.st :aa:(.ents of vrar-j sutraifced
i ,
doc:.:'int; ;ui •jo.si'ta.on, pcr»¥er, and iiifluence. l;o soldier s'boo-: above heitel and
I
•loO.^ and no sailo'.-.- a:x)vc >isder ca:.d t'Oaniba., hho can be responsible for the
' duplioitous diplorsiiicy if not the Mini£:t,ers, von i-eurath =ind idbbentrop,
/
end the dipl^-natU h^ndy I'Tan, vcn ?apm? ,h:io should be .arr-vo-r'_'or b;.e
oionvosei-vo act.'.i-.ds bx'aMon o.f occupied countries i.f Ganleite?:^. Protectors,
1
Governors, and Coni:'icsa.i'G such ns .Frank, Seyss-In-nurrt, T-ricl', von fohii-ach,
von I'^curath, and ..'osenborg are not? V"hcrie-siiaH v;e look for those who mobilised
the ecoiion;';*- for total yie.y ±:C t;.-. ovorlool-: Schacht, and Spoer, and Funlc? *ho v.xis
the mnctcr of itB great slaSclng entorprise if it was not Sauckel? Vtiere stiall
v:e iind tiie land that ran the cone en t r a on camps if it is not the hand of
Ka].tehbn.iDncr? kxA who iriiipped up the hates Snd. fehrs of the'public, and
1
inanipulatocl the Party oi'ganJ.satiorjs to incite tliesc cri^ec, if not' 'less,
"Toi: Se^rirach, Fritsschi:.-, doia'mnn, and the ui-^cpeakable Julius Streicher? The
list of de.fojulants is made up o.L-jnori •/.dio rlaysd indispensnble and ?."jci.jr|pal
?:5arts in -this tragedy. Ihf.i photographs .and iiio filns sl-igw thm again "Oi4
again' top'ithe'i- on inpor'Urnt occasions. The doow.isn'ts shor; thefc agreed on
polic„:-.o ana on 'rntkods, and ail •\»x>rk?..rig aggressively for 'the eiivoansioTi of
Oei'Tiiaiiy by force of. arrns.
/
r.ach of these men riade a real coritribution to 'the i;o,zi plan® bve^t'"
mB.n a key part.. Deprive' the Nazi refp.r.ie of t>ie functions perfortsssd by '
a Schaciit, a Saxvikel, % Vdn PapeiT, or a Goering, and youv have ,a different
rcplqe. book down the rovris of fallen men and picture tiiem as the photographic
.mid -•oc'umentar^. evio.:^ncG sliows them to have been in their da^'s of power# Is
th^ie one whosewattle did not substantially advance the conspiracy along its
• .•
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bloody path toirards its bloody goal? Csn v,-e assuine that the great effort
of these iien's lives ms directed towards ends they never suspected?
To escape the hrplications' of tlieir .positions .and the inference of • •
guilt fror. their activities, ihe defendants are slnost unanimous in.one
defense. Tne pr,train is heard tLne and/again; these men \Tere -Kithout
authority, mtliout knov.aedge, vathout influence, indeed yathout importance.
Funi: sumed up the general 'self-abas^ent of the dock in his plaintive lament
th^it.
"I always, so to spealc, canie up to tiie door. But I was
not penriitted to enter."
In the testimony of each defendant, at some point there was reached
the familiar blank wall: nobody kneyv anything aoout what .was going on.
Time after time vfe' liave heard the chorus from the dock,
uCl^l)
"I only heard about theF.x; things here foi* the :Li2;st thne.
Ihese men saw no evil, sncke none, and none vas uttered in tr.eir presence, fils
olabii mi..ht sound vei:y plausible if iitade by one defendant. But i^hen we puo
all their stories togetner, the impression \iffiich eiV.erges of the Third Reich,
v/hich'was to last'a thousaiid years- ie ludicrous. If v;e combine only the
\ ✓
stories from tlie front bench, tiiis'is tb.e. ridiculous- composite pict-are of
!Iitler's government tiiat emerges. It was composed ofs
A No. 2 man vopd knevr nothing of the excesses of the Gestapo vhich he -
created, and never suspected the Jeydsh extermination progrcui althovigh he
v/as tlie signer of over a score of decrees --.diich instituted the persecutions
of tlmt race;
A Mo. 3 man v/ho was merel./ an innocent middleman tiansmitting Ilitler's
orderr." vrithout even reading them, Ixke a pbstriTan or aelivery boy;
/
A Foreign hdnister wlio Icnew little of foreign affairs and notl-iing
of foreipri policy; ' . ^
A Field Marshal issued orders to tlie armed forces but Imd no
idea of -liie Results they would liave in practice;
A security cliief vho was of the iinpressiop 'that t^ie policdng func
tions of his Gestapo and SD ^bre someydiat dn the order of directing traffic;
I
\
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A Tarty philosopher t^ho vios interested in historical research,
md had no idea of the violence vJiich his philosophy "was inciting in
'^he Tvventieth Century;
A Governor General of Tolan-L vvho reigned hut did not rule;
A Gauleiter of Franconia Vvhose occupation Vvas to pour forth
.'llthy v^ritings about the JevvS, but who had no idea that anybody
•vould read thea;
A iviinister of the Interior who knew not even what went on in
the interior of his own office, xauch less the interior of his own
iepartxnent, and nothing at all about the interior of Genaany-;
A Reichsbank ^resident who was totally ignorant of vdiat 'went
In and out of the vaults of his bank;
And a Tlenipotentiary for the war Economy who secretly
narshaled the entire economy for armament, but had no iaea it had
anything to do with war.
This may seem like a fantastic exaggeration, but this is
vvhat you would actually be obliged to conclude if you Vvere to acquit
these defendants.
They do protest too much, Thej?- deny knovmrig -what was common
knowledge. They deny knowing plans and programs that were as public
as "lEIN KAliPF" and the rarty program. They deny even knowing the
contents of documents they received and acted upon,
Nearly all the defendants take two or more conflicting posi
tions, Let us illustrate the inconsistencies of their positions by
the record of one defendant — one vvho., if pressed, would himself
V
conceded that he is the most intelligent, honorable, and Innocent
'lan in the dock. That is Schacht, And this is the effect of his own
testimony -- but let us not forget that I recite it not against him
alone, but because raont of its self-contradictions are found in the
testimony of several defendants:
Schacht did not openly join the Nazi movement until it had
won, nor evenly desert it until it had lost. He admits that ne never
§ave it p:ubliG oppjosition, but asserts that he never gave it private
loyalty. 'Vhen we demand of him why he did not stop the criminal
'ourse of the regime in which he was a liinlster, he St^ys he had not
I bit of influence. Mien we ask why
•fi
vj
if
k
ii.'.
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^he re:ma'ined a ri^vuiber of the crmiiial ire^lrae, he tells iis that by sticking on
he ej-.oected to moderate its program. Like a .Irahmin among in'itouchablesj he
coudci. not bear to mingle •wi.th the Nazis socially, bul never could he afford
to sspara"te irom them politically. Of all the Nazi aggressions by which he
now cj.a'i^-.;iE 'bo have oeen shocked, tliere is not one that he did not sup
port before the world valh "liie v/eight of his name and prestige. IlLving
ari--'^ d Hitler to blackmail a continent, his answer nov/ is to blame England
and France for yield:big«
Schacht always fought for his position in a i-^gime he novj- affects to
despise. He sometimes disagreed vath his Nazi confederates about vhat was
exioedient in .reaching their goal, but he never dissented from the goal itself.
lie did brealc with thean in the twilight of the regime, it v/as over
tactics, net principles. From then on he never ceased to urge others to
risk their positacns and their necks to forward his plots, but never on any
occasion di-d he iiasai-d either of his o>vn. He now boasts that he personally
would nave shot hitlei;' if he had had the opportunity, but the German newsreel
shows tlv.t even after the fall of France, vrhen he faced the living Hitler,
he stepped out of line to grasp the hand ire now .clalis to loath and hung upon
the TiTOids of tne man he now says he thought unv/ortiiy of belief^ Schacht says
he st-'Ca-iil;- "saootaged" the iir/hLer government.Xet, the most relentless
secret se.'.'vioe ir- tlic v:orld never detected Irim dokng tlie regime any h3.riri
untrl long after he know the vjur to b-c lost and tire Nazis doomed. Schacht,
wh.o dea.Lt '..n hedges all his life, always k.'^ pt himseii-f in a position to cla:im. that
he was in eitiiei- fjamp. fhe plea for him is as specious on analysis as it is
persuasive on fi.rct sight* Sclracht represents the most dangerous and repre
hensible, type of opportunism — that of tlie man of influential position 7^ho
1$ reai.^iy to join a movement that he knows to be wrorig because he thinks it is
•vifituiing. , . ^ •
iiiese defendants, unable to deny that they were the men in the very
top rai'ks of pcwer, aird rinable to deny that the crimes I liave outliiied actu
ally happened, lorow that their denials are incredible unless they can sug-
's
gest soi:Oone who is guilty.
f
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Txie aefendants have been ijnajiiinous, when pressed, in shii'ting the blaine
on ofhni' :;}.en, scnietimes on one and. sojiietimes on another. 3ut -fche names thev
nave repeated3.~'' picked are iii'bler, HinaiLler, ke^'drica, 'j-oebbels, and Boimiann.
..Al.'. .o:l tliese are c.ead or liiissing. Ho ms-tter hov/ lia;rd tjq have pressed the
•deiendants on the stand, they'hj3.ve never pointed the finger at a liviixg '.-nan
as guiltj-. It is a temptation to ponder the v/ondroas v/oriciiAgs of a fate
iihi^ch has left only the guilty dead and oru.y the innocent alive. It is almost
too rer:ark?.ble.
The chief villain on viiom blar-.ie is placed, — so-ie of iiie defendants
vie vith eacl: other iu producing: appropriate epith.ets — is Hitler, He is 'the
ma7"i''at •'v'hom nearly every defendant has pointed an accusiitg finger,
I shall not dissent from this consensus, nor do X deny that ail these
doad or missing men sliared the guij.crimes so i-eprehensible that degrees
of guilt have lost their significance they may have played the most evil
parts. But their guilt cannot exculpate the defendants. Hitler did not
carry all responsibility to the gr-ave mtJ'i hira. AU. the guilt is not wrapped
in Hinmiler's shroud, it was these dead v/hom these living chose to be their
partners in this groat conspiratorial brotherhood,' and the crii.:es tlvrt they
tiid together thej'" must p=y for one by one.
It may v.ell bo said that Hitler's final crime wa.s agcdnst the land
th.at he ruled. He was a mad mesnia:! who started the war vdthout cause
and prolonge;. it mthout reason. If he could not r-ule 'm cared not what
happened to Genriany. As Iritzsche has told us from -die stand, Hitler'tried
to use the defeat of Geryicny for the self-destruction of the German people.
lie continued the fight when he Imew it could hot be won, and continuance meant
onlj' i'uin. Speer, in thJ.a courtroom, has described it as follows:
"... The sacrifices which : on both sides ajfter
Joniiar^'- 19a5 were without sense. Ihe dead of tliis j^eriod
will be tlie accusers of the nan responsible for the con-
ti:u\ation of tVrit fight, Adolf I-iitJ-er', j'jst as much as, the
destroyed cities, destroyod in tliat last base, who had lost
troinc.?ndous cultural values and trenendous •n':jiibors of dwell
ings.,, Tlifi German people remaiiied faithful to Adolf Hitler
rintil ihe end,, lie has bet.rayeu. them Kr^awiniiiy. He has
i.ried to thnw it into the abyss,
Hitler ordered ever:/ one else to fight to tire last and the-i retreated
into deatli by his own hand. But he left life as he lived it, a deoeiverj he
v;;
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T_left' tae 6ff'icia3. report tliat he had died in b-:ttle. This ms the man -»vhom
•tiie'se- defendants er-ialted to a Fnehi^er. Tl:- -^Tas they v:ho conspired to get him
absolute authors.ty over all'of Qennanty. And in the end he and the system they
•created for birii' b,vor.jjht the ruin of them all. As stated by Speer on cross-
exavi'.natlon: . . ' .
•"•..'•the tretnondous clanger^ ,ho^.-everj contained in this '
totalitarian system only became abundantly clear at tlie
jnometit -iyben no •'//ere ?jpproacliirig tlie end. It v/as then
that, one could sec vrhat the meaning of tlis principle
'.vasj, na.nely, t'lat every order should be can-ied out v/ith-
out ony criticism. Eveiyth^ng... you ha\'e seen in the
v;ay of orders'-sv-hich v.-ere- carried out i-vi-bhout cun;/" consid-
eration, did after all tum. out to be mJ.stL'ices... This
sysUiTi — let me put it li]cG fds — xo the end of the
sys ixi-m it hc-.s become clear T.\h.at •ti-eneudous dai'igers are
contained in scaj such spstcm, as such, quite a-jart from
Ili'bler's priliiciple. 'The o ' '' .n of ili-iler and this
S"'-s-tom, then, bpoiufnt about uhis trfmiendcus catastraphe "
to tlds ™rld."UnO
3ut let nie for a moment tum devil's advc'cate. I admit that Hitler
Trvas the chief villain. ;>vit for the defendants to put aU. blame on him is
neither manly nor. true. Ve Imov/ that even the head of a state has the same
limits to his senses -and to the hours of his day as do lesser men. Hs must
rely on others to be his and ears as to most that goes on in a great
empire. Other legs must run his errands; other }iands must execu^te his
plans. On v4ioni did Hi-ble.r rely fo.r siioh things more tliSii upon these men
in the dock? Wlao led him to believe he had an inv:lncible air armada if
not Goering? "ho kept disagreeable facts from hj/m? Did not C-oering forbid
Fielctiiarshal Hilch to Vv-a?mi Hitler that in his o'pinion Gemnany -was not equal
to t]ie iYar upon rtossiaV Did not Goorlngj accordinr to Gpeer, relieve
General Oallnnt of his ai.r force comm^md for spoa]-:ing of 'the vfealmesses
and biriulin,;' of tlie air force?yrho "-d Hitler, utterly untraveled
himself, to believe in tlie indGcisiori and tiruldi'fy of democratic peoples
if not fiibbejitrop, von Ne^-iratii, and von Papen? 7/ho fed his illusion of
Geriiian invinclbij.xty if not Kei'tel, Jodl, i^aeder and DoenitK? V-ho kept
his ha.tred of the Jevf inflamed more 'bhs.n Ctreicher sn.d Rosenberg? Viio
v/ould H'jtler say deceived bin about condi'bions lin concentration ca.mps,if
not Kaltenbrunnen, even as he "woulfi deceive us? Thege men had access to
Hitler, and of"ben could control the informatifjn that reached him and on
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vjhl-)h^h& nu:::t'bav^e "his pojicy and I'lis on'.nrs. They tii£' Praetorian Guard^
and ^-frhile the;;'-' ".^ere uiider Cseoar's orders, Caesar v.'as aLvfays in riandc.
If these dead ^len'ooiiLd talte the T.d.uiess staid a.nd anc"*7ei' "diat i.\ae
been said agsdnst the:'!!, might have a less distorted picture of the parts
played by these, defendarriis. Liiagine -the- stir that vrould occur in tiic docl:
if it should behold Ado'.' " Hitler advancing the viitness box, or Hlnvnlsr
vfith an. armful, of dossiers, or Ooebbela.^ or Bormanniiith the reports of his
' t
Party spies, or the murdered iloshmi or toiaris. Tiie'gho'ilish defense that
the 7^)rld is'entitled to 2?etrioritJ..cai only from the. csfiavers, is -an argument
'/rortly of the criv-iCiS at v^hich it is directed.
Y'e have presented to tM.s Tribunal an affirrAative Craso based on
I
incrinvlnf'.ting documents viiich are s-.ifj.icient, if urie.xpla.ii.c i, tc reoair': a
finc-i":., of guilt on Coxmt One each dofend^it. In the final analysis,
the only question is -./nether the dGfoiidants' orrn iiestis^iony is tc be crcdl Uvd
as against tiie document^ and o^her evidence of their guilt. Viihat, then, is
theii- testi.00ijy i\orth?
The fact ir tiiat tlie Nazi liabit- of economising in the use of truth
/
pifLls the fo^indations out from urxder their orm defenses. lying iias alv;ays
been a highly approved Masi technique. Hiti.er, in .HAUFJP," advocated
mendacity d.s a policy, von .^'dbbentrop admits tl-^e use of the "diplor.Tr.tio
Keitel advised that the facts of rearmaiTient be hept secret so
i-,hat they could be denied at Geneva.iiaed.er deceived about rebirLi.ding
(161)the Gen-Aan no-Yir in .Txolaldcn of Versailles.' ' Goeiing xirged ilibbentrop
to tell a 'O.egal lie" 'to the British Foroig.n Gffice about the Anschluss,
fuid 'Xxi so doing only marshaied him the :Tay ho ms going.p06.ririg gave
his vrard. of honor to the Czechs and proceeded to bicci
•;rcposo-d to deceive trie French into revealing the specially ti-aitied araqng
their piisoners.
Nor is the lie direct the only moans of falsehood. They al3. speak
a Nazi doubletal): vrith ivtilch to deceive the imV/ary. In the Nazi di.etlona.ry
of sardonic euphfmiisms I'Finsj. solution" of the Je-wish probleia a plirase
wliich meant e:^terulnationj ".Special ti'eatment" of prisoriea^s of war meant
w.,
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killing; "Froteciive ciiGfcodj-'* meant concontratlon csiop; labor" raoari.t
flave-labor; anF an oy-der to "take a rina attitude" or "t*al<e positive
y~ ^
noasures" meant to act vfith'unrestrained savaV;er/, Qefore Vve accept their
word at r/hat seems -to be its face, tb m:it alwt.ys look dor hidden -i.canir.[.''"s«
Coering assured usj on his oatJi^ tiiat the deich deionse Council never met
,, ,
'as s\3cn."^~- ' F-nen ue produced the-stenograpiiic minutes of s !ieeting at
which -Ue presided and did most of the talking, he rei-dnded us o;C the "as
fuch" and explained this was not a meeting, of the Cour.cil "as Quch" because
(166)
otier _oi'£ons "(vcro present. . ' Goe.-.d-nc, denies "t)'ii''eatenlng" Czechoslovakia
he onig' told President Hacha that he wou].d "h.atB to bonib the bcaut.tf-.j.l c:itv
cf Prague.
Besides outright false ctxitomcnts and doubletakk, thes-e are also other
circumventions of truth in tli© natui^e of fantaistio explsjiations and absurd
pi'Ofesslos.s. Streicher iias solejuxiiy maintained that ids onj-y thought v4.tti
respect'to tho Jews was to resettle them 011 tlie Island, of tIadago.scar,
His reason .i^or destro^rlng s-;Tiapoguef?, he blandly saif'., was orly loec-ausr:; they
•v:ere architectui^ally offensive# (169) Rosenberg was stated by his coiuiscl
to rur.ve always ha.d in rd-nd a "chivalrous solution" to the Jewish proidem.
V-lien it wafe necessaiy to remove pchuschilg^- after the Anschlusc, liibbentrop
•\'0-aid have had us believe that the Austri«'iii CnanceH'or -s-vas resting at a
(170)
"villa." It v.'as left to oross-oz-cajnination to reveal that the "villa" was
(171)Buchenviald Concentration Gaiiip, ^"-p' ^-,g reco-rd is full of other eiiarr.ples of
dios-i-'Ulr-tionr and evasions, 'h'dn Soli.acht showed tliat he, too, had adootod
the Hasi attiti-ide tlzat trutu ib any stor37- ^dllch succeeds. Confro^itei .on
cross-'jxaoiination "v-.rth a j.ong record of orohen vovrs and falGC vo.'.xlc, lie
declared ir» justification -
"I think you can score imany -aore successes when you want
to lead someone If you don't toll them the truth than if
you tail them tiie truth. "1172}
This v-jas the philosophy of the National Sot;ialiGts. tdien for years
tlicy have deceived the wicrld^ and masked falsehood with plausibilities, can
aix one be surprised that tlxey continue the habits of a lifoti.ie hi tlris
dockV Credil/lliu^; is one of the ma^n issues of this trial. Only those who
"••y.vp-
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Aave ."Cailoo to ie;:;rn tJio '.iii-ote- lessons of the last decade can doubt that
•jn vdic have al7,T.;/s plcX/ed. on the \insusnec tin^ crerhHit/ of generous ov;none'nts
."ould not hesi'tetG to do the s-eme novf.
It is against such a background that these defendants no-?-- asl: this
I'ribunal to ss.f that thej are not guil-tjr of planning, ei-cecuting, or con- '
•piring to concuit tiiis long list of criines and v>Tong.s. Ti-^ej stand before
the record of tiiis -trial as blood-stained Gloucester stood by the body of
'lis sla:n King. He begged of the vfido-\y, as they beg of you: "5ay I slevr
-heni not." kn<i tiio Queen replied, "Then say they were not slaiii» But dead
bhoy c.re,,.g" If you v*ere to sry of these ::en
bliat the;,'' sre not guilt;/-, it v/ould be as t-nic to sa.y tiiere has been no v/ar,
there a-ce no clain, tfiere has been no crime.
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7. Law to change the Penal Code of 38 June 1935, 1935 Reichngesetsblatt,
Part I, p. 839. (1962—PS, USA—P, Tr.p, 255). "Any person who
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the future in Germany even in cases when no law threatens it with
punishment. Even v;ithout the tiireat of punishment every violation
of the goals of life which the community sets up for itself is a
wrong,
9. Affidavit of Dr. Hans Anschuet^, 17 November 1946 (2967-PS, USA-756,
Tr.p. 255), 4bn years of Security Police and SD. (1680-PS, U?!A-477,
Tr.p.1892).
10. Transcript p. 6073. This bureau ws.s camouflaged under the name of
• "Research Office of the Alrforce." (Tr. p. 5880),
1
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Number
11 •
12,
13,
14,
15,
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
Deoree of the Reich President for the Protection of the
People and State, 28 February 1953, 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt,
Part I, p. 83 (1390-PS, USA-F, Tr,p, 255), Supra, Note 5.
Organizationbuch der NSDilP, 1943 edition, pp, 99-104(1893-PS, USA-323„ Tr.p, 1578),
Meaning and Tasks of the Secret State Police, published in
The Archives, January 1936, Vol, 23-24, p. 1342 (1956^PS,
USA-F, Tr. p, 255).
Original Protective Custody Order ser"^ed ort Dr, R» Kempner,
15 March 1935 (2499-PSj USA-232, Tr, p, 1399), Extraat
from article "Legislation and Judiciary in Third Reich"
from Journal of the Academy for German Lav/, 1936, pp, 141-142{2533-PS, USA-F, Tr, p. 255),
Law on the Secret State Pol-ice of 10 February 1936, Prussian
Gesetzemmhung, p, 21, "Orders in matters of the Secret
State Police are not subject to reviev/ of the administrative
courts," (2107-PS, Tr, p, 1904), %imniary of decisions
of the Suureme Administrative Court, 1935 Reichsverwaltungs-
blatt, Voi; 56, No, 29, pp. 577-578, 20 July 1935 (2347-PS,
Tr, p. 1904),
Affidavit of Dr. Hans Anschuetz, 17 Noveraber 1945 (2967-PS,
USA-756, Tr. p. 255),
Letter from Guertner to Mutschmann, 18January 1935, ©on-
cerning charges against members of camp personnel of
protective custody Gamp Hohnstein (783-PS, USA-731,
Tr, p, 255), Letters from Minister of Justice to Hess
and SA Chief of Staff, 5 June 1935, concerning penal pro
ceedings against merchant and SA Leader and 22 companions
because of inflicting bodily injury on duty (784-PS,
USA^732, Tr. p. 255), Memorandum of Guertner concerning
legal proceedings against the camp personnel of concentraf-
tion camp Hohnstein (785-PS, 0SA-733, Tr, p, 255),
Minister of Justine memorandum^ 29 November 1935, concern-
inig pardon of those sentenced in connection with mistreat-
ment in Holmsteln concentration camp (786-PS, USA-734,
Tr, p, 255),
Affidavit of Dr, Kans Anschuetz, 17 November 1945 (3967-PS,
USA-756, Tr, p, 255]•
Affidavit of Dr. Kans Anschuetz, 17 November 1945 (2967-PS
USA--756, Tr, p, 255), Law amending regulations of criminal
lav; and criminal procedure, 84 April 1934^ 1934 Reichs
gesetzblatt, Part I, p, 341 (2014-PS, USA-C, Tr, p; 255),
Law on People's Court and on 25th Amendment to Salary Law
of 18 April 1936, 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, po 169(2342-PS, USA-0, Tr. p, 255).
"The Nazi Plan", exoerpt of script of a motion picture
composed of captured German film, (3054-PS, USA-ie?,
Tr, p, 1264).
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:l. Decree of the Government concerniiig formatioriL of Special
Courts, 21 March IQ'SS, 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, pp»
136-137. (2076-PS, USA-G, Tr. p. 255). Decree concerning
the extension of the Jurisdiction, of Special Courts,
20 November 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1632,
(2056-PS, US/-Oj Tr, p. 255). Affidavit of Dr. Hans
Anschuetz, 17 November 1945 {2967-PS, USA-756, Tr. p. 255).
22* Extract from German Justice, a legal periodical, loth year,
Edition A, No. 42, 16 October 1942. "The judge is there
fore not the supervisor of, but the direct assistant in
the Administration of the State. He is responsible to the
leadership of the State (Staatsfuhrung) v^ithin his sphere
of duty for the conservation of the national community.
By protecting the national values (Volkische V/erte) and
eliminating (dangerous elements from the community of
the people) he is, in this respect akin to the political
leader, the promulgator of national self preservation
(Volkische Selbsterhaltung), Tills point of view must be
decisive for the judge. The judge taking it fo-r his
guiding principle will find many a decision which seemed
very difficult to be solved at first, facilitated."(2482-iPS, USA-G, Tr, p. 255)* Extract from pamphlet,
"Judges Letters", concerning' judgment of Lower Court*
24 April 1942* on coHicealment of Jewish identification
(D-229* USA-C, Tr. p. 255).
23, Lecture of JVIajor-General Thomas-delivered 24 May 1939.. at
the Eoreign Office (EC-28, USA-760, Tr. pp. 275, 5124).
24, The treaties and assurances applicable to each are specified
in Appendix G of the Indictment and remain uncontradictedi
25. i^nglish transcript p. 5980, "The Hague Convention was for
land warfare. VJhen I scanned it over on tlie eve of the
Polish campaign* I was reading the Articles and I was sorry
that I had not studied them much sooner. If X had done so
I would have told the Fuehrer that v/lth these rules as they
had been put down, paragraph by paragraph, a modern war
could not be waged, but that in a modern war, with its
technical improvements* the stipulations of 1906 and 1907
would have to be changed in order to have a new type of
warfare."
26, English transcript p. 6016,
27, Memorandum of 15 September 1941, from Ganaris to Keitel
concerning an OIGV Order regulating the treatment of Soviet
prisoners of war (EC-338, USSR-366, Tr, p. 4441), "The
Geneva Convention for the treatment of 'Prisoners of war is
not binding in the relationship betv/een Germany and the
USSR, therefore only the principles of general international
law oh the treatment of prisoners of war apply. Since the
18th century these have gradually been established along
the linos that war captivity is neither revenge nor punish
ment, but solely protective custody (Sioherheltsschaf't) the
only purpose of which is to prevent the prisoners of v/ar
from a further participation in the war. This principle was
developed in accordance v/ith the viev; held by all armies
that It is contrary to military tradition to kill or injure
helpless people; this is also in the interest of all belli-
goronts in order to prevent mistreatment of their ovm
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S7»(cont*d,) soldier;^ in case of capturee eThe instimotions
are very general. But if one considers their basic
principles the expressly approved measures v/ill re
sult in arbitrary mistreatments and killings, the
formal prohibition of arbitrary action notwithstanding."
28. Hitler Commando Order, 18 October 1942 (498-P8 XTSA-501
Tr, p. 1944, 2173). Night and Fog Decrees, 7'and 12 Deoember
1942 (L—90, TJSA-503, Tr, p. 1945). Minister of Labor Order
on employment of French prisoners of wax in armament in
dustry, August 1941 (3005-PS,. USA-213, Tr. p. 3010).
Himmlar Order to protect lynchers of allied fliers
10 August 1943' (R-110, TJSA-333, Tr. p. 1624). ' '
29, Decree appointing Sauckel General Plenipotentiary for
Manpov/er, 21 IVIarch 1942, and decree of Goerin^ conferring
certain pov/ers on Sauckel, 27 March 1942. 1942 Reichs-
gesetzblatt, Part I, pp. 179--180 (1666-PS, USA-208
pp. 1337, 4063). ' "
30., Speer's conference minutes of Central Planning Board, 1942-44
concerning labor supply. "Our best new engine is made 88'^'
by Russian prisoners of war and the other 12®^S by German
men and v/omen...The list of the shirkers should be entrusted
to Kimmler^s trustVvrorthy hands who will make them work all
right." (Milch, p. 26) R-124, USA-179, Tr. pp. 1313, 1320.
31,. Top secret memorandum signed by Brautigam, 25 October 1942
concerning conditions in Russia (294-PS, USA-185, Tr, p. ll1293
32. Speer's conference minutes of Central Planning Board, 1942-
44, concerning labor supply, (R-124, p. 22, USA 179,
Tr. pp. 1286, 1293, 1309, 2989.) By an official directive,
"Estates of those v/ho refuse to v/ork are to be burned their
relatives are to be arrested as hostages and to be brought
to forced labor camps", and the'burning of homes in connec
tion with labor conscription ;vas therefore not considered
culpable. Letter from Rosenberg hiinistry, 12 NoTpembor 1943
concerning burning of houses in Mueller's district. (290-PS
USA-189, Tr.- p. 1304). The burning down" of houses was a *
method used to force citizens in ooouoiod territories into
Reich labor. Letter from Rabb to Reichmlnister for
Occupied Eastern Territories.. 7 June 1944, concerning burn
ing of houses in fmssilkow district. {254-PS, USA-ieS
Tr. p. 1300). Forced labor agents caught persons attending
churches and theaters and transported thorn to the Reich.
Lammers report to Himmlorj, 12 April 1943, concerning the
situation in the Government General. (2220-^PS, USA-175
I'r. p. 1275). *
53. Report to Reich Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories
7 October 1942, concarning treatment of Ukrainian Special-V uor o e i aimenT; r ij
ists (054-PS, USA-196, Tr. p. 1314), Interdepartmental
report of Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories 30
September 1942, ooaceming status of Eastern laborers. . "In
this train women eave birth to babies who
ocjjocJiiAuux j.y±<o uujLiiuc;xii±ij.g ao u o ux xi ouer / "
g were thrown*out
of the windows dpring the journey, people, having tuber
culosis and venereal diseases rode In the same car dying
people lay iii. freigh carp without-straw, and one of the
dead v;as thrown on the railroad embankment. The ^ame must
have ocoured in other returning transports," f094-FR
USA-199, Tr. n. TKT7K *p, 151 ),
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34. Sauokel's labor Mobilization Program 20 April 1942. "Apart
from the prisoners of war still in the occupied te.oritories,
we must, therefore, requisition skilled or unskilled male
and female labor from the Soviet territory from the age
of 15 up for the labor mobilization." p, 7 (016~PS
USA-.168, Tr, :-p. 1319). ^ ^ '
35.
36»
37.
38.
Affidavit of Edv/ard L. Deuss, 1 November 1945, ooHcerning
approximate number of foreign workers for German War Effort
in Old Reich (2520-PS, USA-197, Tr. p. 1312).
Bfemoranduni to Mr. Eupe, 14 arch 1942, concerning employment
of Russians. (D-316, USA-201, Tr. p. 1320).
Affidavit of Dr. V/ilhelm Jheger, 15 October 1945. "Condi
tions in all of those camps were extremely bad. The camps
were greatly overcrowded. In some camps there were twice
as many people in a barrack as health conditions permitted...
Camp Eumboldstrasse has been inhabitated by Italian pris
oners of Y/ar. After it had been destroyed by an air raid,
the Italians were removed and 600 Jewish females from
Buchenv/ald Concentration Camp v/ere brought in to work at
the Krupp factories. Upon my first visit at Camp Eumbold
strasse, I found these femr.ies suffering from open foster
ing wounds and other diseases. I was the first doctor they
had seen for at least .a fortnight. There was no doctor in
attendance at the Gamp. There v/ere no medical supplies in
the Camp. They had no shoes and went about in their bare
feet. The sole clothing of each consisted of a sack with
holes for their arms and head. Their hair was shorn.
The Gamp was surrounded by barbed vdre and closely guarded
by SS guards." pp. i, 5. (D.288, USA^202, Tr. p. 1322).
Secret Order of Reichsfuehrer SS, 20 February 1942, ooncerninr
oommibment of manpower from the East. "In severe case
that is in such cases v/here the measures at the disposal
of the leader of the guard do not suffice, the state police
office has to act with its they will
5, that is
. , , „ . , . c>amp or with special
USA^207 Tr*is hanging," (3040-PS,
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39.
40.
41.
48.
43.
44.
45.
Order signed Christiansen, 19 March 1943, to all gronp
leaders of Security Service, and record of telephone con
versations signed by Stap,i,'ll March 1945 (3012-PS, USA-190,
Tr. pp. 1304, 12200). Ls" jr of Terboven to Goering,
dated 1 May 1942. (R. 134, RD-293, Tr..p. 6235). Goering
has adiiiitted the excesses in occupied territories: I
do^not in any way wish to dispute that things took place
which may be debated as far as international law is con
cerned, and other things occurred which under every
circumstance may be considered and must be considered as
excesses." (Tr. p. 5952). ,
Rxcerpts from Frank*s Diaryi {USSR-223) (English translation
p. 45).
Stenographic report on conference between Goering and
Reich Commissioners for Occupied Territories, 8 August
1942. (USSR-170, Tr. p. 5V20^ EC-317, Tr.jp. 5903, 5904)
Report to Fuehrer regardir • confiscated art treasures,
20 March 1941. (014-PS, UfA-7e4, Tr, p. 6213). Field
Marshal Kesselring, Goeriiri's suhordinate, testified that
his method of punishing th.^ small-scale looting of
common soldiers under his command was by shooting on the
spot. (Tr. p. 5775).
Hague CoEvention IV,., Articles 45, 46, 47, 50, 52.
Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Kastnor, former president of the
Hungarian Zionist Organization, 13 September 1945. (2605-PS,
USA-242, Tr. pp. 1408, 1409).
Affidavit of Dr. Wllhelm oettl, 5 November 1945. (2738-PS,
Tr. p. 1502). Affidavits of Hermann Graebe. "Moennikes
and I v/ent direct to the pits. Nobody bothered us. Now
I heard rifle shots in quick succession, from behind one of
the earth mounds. The people v/ho had got off the trucks -
men, women, and children of all ages - had to undress upon
the orders of an SS-man, who carried a riding or dog whip.
They had to put dovm their clothes in fixed places, sorted
according to shoes, top clothing. XT saw a heap of shoes of
about 800 to 1000 pairs, groat piles of under-linen and
clothing. V/ithout screaming or weeping these people un
dressed, stood around in family groups, kissed each other,
said farewells and waited for a sign from another SS-man,
vjho stood near the pit, also with a whip in his hand.
During the 15 minutes that I stood near the pit I heard
no complaint or plea for m(."cy. I watched a family of about
8 persons, a man and v/oman, both about 50 with their
children of qbout 1, 8 and 10, and two grown-up daughters
of about 20 to 24, An old woman ^\dth snow-white hair was
holding the one-year old child in her arms and singing to it,
and tickling it. The child was cooing with delight. The
couple were looking on with tears in their eyes. The father
was holding the hand of a boy about 10 years old and speaking
to him softly; tho boy was fighting his tears. The father
pointed toward the sky, stroked his head, and seemed to ex
plain something to him. At that moment the SS-man at the
pit shouted something to his comrade. The latter counted
off about 20 persons and instructed them to go behind the
earth mound. Among them was the family, v/hich I have men
tioned, I well remember e girl, slim and with black hair,
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(cont'd.)
who, as she passed close to me, pointed to herself and
said, "23". I walked around the mound, and found
myself confronted by a tremendous grave,. People v/ere
closely wedged together and lying on top of each other
so that only their heads were visible. Nearly all had
blood running over their shoulders from their heads.
Some of the people shot v/ere still moving. Some were
lifting their arms and turning their heads to show
that they were still alive. The pit was already 2/3
full, I estimated that it already contained about
1000 people. I looked for the man who did the shoot
ing. He v/as an SS-man, who sat at the edge of the nar
row end of the pit, his feet dangling into the pit.
He had a tommy gun on his knees and was smoking a
cigarette.. The people, completely naked, went do^^vn
some steps which v/ere out in the clay wall of the pit
and clambered over the heads of, the people lying there,
to the place to which the SS-man directed them. They
lay dov/n in front of the dead or injured people; some
caressed those who were still alive and spoke to them
in a low voice. Then I heard a series of shots. I
looked into the pit and saw that the bodies v/ere
twitching or the heads lying already motionless on
top of the bodies thst lay before them. Blood v/as run
ning from their necks. I v/as surprised that X was not
ordered away, but I saw that there were tv/o or three
postmen in uniform nearby. The next batch was approach-
Ing already. They v/ent dov/n into the pit, lined' them
selves up against the previous victims* and v/ere shot,
V/hen I walked back, .round the mound I noticed another
truck-load of people which had just arrived. This time
it Included sick and infirm persons. An old, very thin
v/oman with terribly thin legs was undressed by others
who v/ere already naked, while tv/o people held her up.
The woman appeared to be paralysed. The naked people
carried the woman around the mound. I left with
MOENNIKES and drove in my car back to Dubno,"(g992-PS, pp. 2, 3; U3A-494, Tr. p. 1922).
46. SD Inspector Bierkamp's letter, 12 December 1941, to HSIU
enclosing copy of secret decree signed by Bormann, entitled
"Relationship of National Socialism and Christianity," '
(D-75, USA-348, Tr. p. 1537).
47 Extracts from "The Myth of the 20th Century"., by Alfred
Rosenberg, 1941# "A German religious movement whicb would
like to develop into a folk-church will have to declare that
the idea of neighborly love is unconditionally to be sub
ordinated to the idea of national honor, that no act of a
German church may be approved which docs not primarily
serve the safeguarding of the folkdom." p. 608, f?34n-P8
USA-352, Tr., p. 1642)» '
48, Documents on RSHA meeting conoerning the study and treat- "
ment of church positions. (1815-PS,, USA-510, Tr. p, 1956).
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49,
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
Secret letter, 21 April 1942, from SB to all concentration
camp commanders, concerning treatment of priests^(1164-?S>
USA-756, Tr. p. 255). Report from the Bavarian i-olitical
Police to the Gestapo,, Berlin, 24 August 1954, concerning
National mourning on occasion of death of von Hindenburg(1521-PS, USA-740, Tr. p. 255). Letter from Kerrl to
ilinister of State, 23 luly 1938, with enclosures dealing
with persecution of Bishop Sproll (849-PS, USA-354, Tr. p.
1644). Gestapo telegram: from Berlin to Nurnberg, 24 July
1938, dealing with demonstrations against Bishop Sproll
in Rottenburg (848-PS, USA-353, Tr. p. 1642). Goering
has admitted the policy of sending clergyment to concentra
tion camps. (Tr. p. 5853).
Gestapo order, 20 January 1938, dissolving and confiscating
property of Catholic Youth V/omen's Orgai^izations in
Bavaria. (1481-PS, USA-737, Tr. p. 255). See also Tr. p. 56-
Order of Frick, 6 November 1934, addressed inter alios to
Prussian Gestapo, prohibiting publication of Protestant
Church announcements. (149B-PS, USA-739, Tr. p. 255).
Bormarui's letter to Rosenberg, enclosing copy of letter,
24 January 1959, to Minister of Education, requesting
restriction or elimination of theological faculties. (116-PS
USA-635, Tr. p. 2792). Bormann's letter to Rosenserg, 17
April 1939, enclosing copy of Minister of Education letter
6 April 1939, on elimination of theological faculties in
various universities, (122-PS, USA-362, Tr, p. 1658).
Secret letter, 20 July 1933, to provincial governments and
the Prussian Gestapo from Frick, concerning Confessional
Youth Organizations. (1482-PS, U3A-758, Tr. p. 255.).
Gestapo order 20 January 1938, dissolving and confiscating
property of Catholic Youth V/omen's Organizations in Bavaria.
•(1481-PS, USA-737, Tr. p. 255). State Police Order, 28 May
1934 at Dusseldorf, signed Sohmid, concerning sanction of
denominational youth and professional associations and dis
tribution of jjnblications in churches. (R-145, USA-74b,
Tr. p. 255).
Report by Headquarters, Third United States Army, 21 June
1945, concerning Flossenburg Concentration Camp. {2309-PS,
USA-245, Tr. pp. 1398. 1412). Affidavit of Hans Marsalak,
8 April 1946, concxerning Mauthausen Concentration Gamp and
dying statement of Franz Zlereis, the Commandant. (3870-PSj
USA-797, Tr. p. 7699). American'concentration camp films(2430-rPS, USA-79, Tr. p. 593). Soviet atrocity fil.ms
(USSR-81, Tr. p. 4673). Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinanc
Hoess, 5 April 1946: ".....I commanded Auschwitz until 1
December 1943, and estimate that at least 2,500,000 victims
were executed and exterminated there by gassing and buring,
and at least another half million succumbed to starvation ar.
disease making a total dead of about 3,000,000. This figui'--
represents about 'lO'fo or 80^ of all persons sent to Auschwi'':;
as prisoners, the remainder having been selected and used fo
slave labor in the concentration camp industxres. Included
among the executed and burnt were approximately 20,000
Russian prisoners of war (previously screened out of
Prisoner of V/ar cages by the Gestapo) whowero delivered &%
Auschwitz in V/ehrmacht transports operated by regular
«« 8 w
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(cent )
55,
• 'M-
Wehrmacht officers and meni The remainder of the total
number of victims included about 100,000 German lews,
and great numbers of citizens, mostly Jewish from
Holland, France, Belgium, Foland, Hungary, Czechoslo
vakia, Greece, or other countries. We executed about
400,000 Hungarian Jews alone at Auschv/itz in the summer
of 1944c •»#.•! visited Teblinka to find out hov/ they
carried out their extermination. The Camp Commandant
at Treblinka told me that he had liquidated 80,000
in the course of one-half year. He was principally
concerned vdth liquidating all the Jews from the
V/arsaw Ghetto, He used monoxide gas and I did not '
think that his methods v/ere very efficient. So when
I set up the extermination building at Auschwitz,
I oused Gyclon B, which was a crystallized Prussic
Acid v^hioh v;e dropped into the death chamber from a
small opening. It took from 3 to 15 minutes to kill
the people in the death chamber depending upon climatic
conditions. We knev/ when the people were dead because
their screaming stopped, V/e usually waited ab.outone-
half hour before we opened the doors and removed the
bodies. After the bodies v/ere removed our special
commandos took off the rings and extracted the gold
from the teeth of the corpses,
"Another improvement we made over Treblinka was that
we built our gas chambers to accommodate g,000 people
at one time, v/hereas at Treblinka their 10 gas chambers
only accommodated gOO people each, T)ie way we selected
our victims was as follows: v/e had two SS doctors on
duty at Auschwitz to examine the incominig transports
of prisoners. The prisoners v/ould he marched by one
of the doctors v/ho v/ould make spot decdsions as they
v/alked by. Those v/ho were fit v/ork were sent into
the Camp, Others were sent immediately to the ex
termination plants. Children of tender years were
invariable exterminated since by reason of their
youth they were unable to work. Still another im
provement we made over Treblinka was that at Trebdinka
the victims almost always knew that ' they were to be
exterminated and at Auschwitz we endeavored to fool
the victims into thinking that they were to go
through a delousing process. Of course, frequently
they realized our true intentions and we sometimes had
riots and difficulties due to that fact. Very frequent
ly women would hide their children under the clothes
but of course v/hen we found them we would send the
children to be exterminated, V/e wore required to carry
out these extermlnatioxis in socrecy but of course the
foul and nauseating stench from the contirLuous burning
of bodies permeated the entire area and all of the
people living in the surrounding communities knew that
exterminations were going on at Auschwitz", fsfifift-ps
USA-619, Tr, p, 7810). '
Testimony of V/itness Blaha, jTr, pp, g592 g636).
Testimony of J/itness Hoess. (Tr, pp. 7765, 7820,)
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56..
57,
58,
59, "
Testimony of the Defendant Funk, And when these
measures of terror and violence against lews were
put up to me, I suffered a nervous breakdown because
at the moment it came to my mind with all clearness
that from here on the catastrope took its course
all the way up to the terrible and atrocious things
about which v;e have heard here^ and about which I
knew only in part from the time of my captivity,
I felt ashamed and the feeling of guilt at that
moment and I do feel the same v;ay today, but too
late," (Tr, pp. 904S-3), von Schlrach has testi
fied that "Hitler's racial policy v;as a crime"
(Tr, p. 10S95) and that Auschwitz "is the greatest
and most devilish mass murder of history." (Tr. p.
10293).
Testimony of Frank, ".,,,1 myself have never-
installed an extermination camp for Jews or demanded
that they should be installed, but if Adolf Hitler
personally has turned that dreadful responsibility
over to these people of his, then it must be mine
too," (Tr. p. 8099),
\
Eng>i-sh transcript p, 13116,
Hitler, "Hein Kampf", "In regard to this point I
should like to make the following statement: To
demand that the 1914 frontiers should be restored
is a glaring political absurdity that is fraught
with such conseq_uenoes-as to make the claim itself
appear criminal. The confines of the Reich as they
existed in 1914 were thoroughly illogical,,, ,Y/e
National Socialists must stick firmly to the aim
that vre have set for our foreign policy» namely,
that the German people must be assured the terri
torial area which is necessary for. it to exist
on this earth...The territory on which one day
our German peasants will be able to bring forth
and nourish their sturdy sons will justify the
blood of the sons of tjie peasants that has to be
shed today", (GBi»128, Tr. pp, 2281-2),
- 10
*r
" PootnotG
i?un"ber
SO.
61.
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63.
64.
65.
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68.
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Hitler, "Mein Kampf" (GB-128, Tr.p. 2286).
Hitler, "Mein Eamnf". "The soil on v/hich v;e nov/ live v;as not
a gift "bestowed "by Heaven on our forefathers. But they had to
conquer it "by risking their lives. Go also in the future our
people v;ill not obtain territory, and therev;ith the means of
existence, as a favor from any other people, "but will have to
win it "by the power of a triumphant sword." (G-B-128, Tr.p,
2278).
English transcript, pp. 6068-9.
English transcript, p. 6071.
Affidavit of Schmitsler, 10 November 1945 (EG-439, USA-613,
Tr.pp. 282, 283, 2532.
Letter from Kinipp to Hitler, 25 Anril 1933, v/ith enclosure
(I>-157, USA-765, Tr.pp. 299, 5124).
Krupp speech, "Thoughts about the Industrial Enterpriser,"
January 1944. "...I have already often repeated orallj'- as v;ell
as in v;riting, and today I also .went to restate to this group
that, according to the terms of the Dictate of Versailles
(Diktat) Nrupn had to destroy and demolish considerable quan--
titles of machines and utensils of all kinds. It is the one
great merit of the entire German war economy that it did not
remain idle during those bad years, even though its activity
could not be brought to light for obvious reasons. Through
years of secret work, scientific and basic ground work v/as
laid, in order to be ready again to work for the German Armed
Forces at the apnointod hour, without loss of time of exper-
iencQ." (D-317, USA~770, Tr.p. 289).
The Fifth Day of the Party Congress, from Voclkischer Beobachter,
Munich (Southern German) Edition, Issue 258, 14 September 1936,
(2283-PS, USAr-337, Tr.p. 255). The Social Life of the New
Germany v;ith Special C^nsidera^tion of the German Labor Front,
containing principal carts of two NSDAP orders directing seizure
of unions in 1933, pp. 51-54 (392~PS, USAr-326, Tr.p, IGOO).
Organization Book of the NSDAP, the NS30, p. 185 ,(2271-PS,
USA-328, Tr.p. 255). Affidavits of Josef Simon, Chairman of
German Shoemakers Union in 1933 (2335-PS, USA-749, Tr.p, 355)'.
Affidavits of Lorenz Hagan, Chairman of Local Committee, German
Trade Unions, Imrnberg (2334-PS, USA-238, Tr.p. 1405). Affi
davit of Ma.thias Lex, deputy president of the German Shoemakers
Union (2926~PS, USAr-239. Tr.pp. 1406, 2258). Affidavit, 17
October 1945, of Gustav Schiefer, Chairman of General Gorman
Trade Union Association; Local Committee, Munich, 1933 (2377-PS,
USA-74B, Tr.p. 255), Death certificate, Floesenburg Concentra
tion Camp, concerning union leader Staimer aiid official letter
to hie wife, 22 December 1941 (2332~PS, Tr.p^ 255). Death
certificate, Flossenburg Concentration Gamp, concerning union
leader Hermann, and official letter to his wife, 29 December
1941 (2333-P5, USA-744, Tr.p. 255),
"National Socialist Party Correspondence, release of 2 May 1933,
p. 1 (2224-PS, USA-364, Tr.pn, 1662-4). Volkischer Beobachterjj, j. ^ -.w Auuc-— 3: / v'-'xtt-Atouiitir neoGacxiu(People's 6>bscrver) Munich edition, 17 May 1933, Fuehrer Edict,
p, 1,(1940-PS, Tr.p. 255). The German Labor Front, Nature,
Goal, Means - Official publication of the German Labor Frnnt,
footnote on^p. 11 (3275-PS, Tr.p. 255),
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Footnote
Number
69.
70.
a.
72.
73.
74.
75.
Law concerning trustees lator, 19 I^Iay 1933, 1933 Reichsgesetz
blatt.'PaPt I, p. 205 (405-PS, Tr.p. 255).
Speech "by Ley published in Forge of the Sword, with an introduc
tion "by Marshal Goering, pn. 14-17 (1939-PS, Tr.p. 255).
Minutes of secend session of Working Committee of the Reich Defense
held on 26 April 1933 (EC-177» USA-390. Tr.pp. 1699, 1727).
Minutes of conference of sixth session of Working Committee of
Reich Defense Council, held on 33 and 24 January 1934 (-ijC-404,
USA-764, Tr.pp. 291, 6124).
Directive from Bltmherg to Suprome Commanders of Army, ITavy and
Air Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by cony of Reich Defense
Lav; of 21 May 1935 and copy of ttecision of Reich Cabinet of
12 May 1935 on the Council for defense of the Reich (2261-PS,
USA-24, Tr.pp. 277, 392).
Memorandum report about the Four Year PlaJi and preparation of
the war economy, 3b December 1936 (RG-40&, USA-579, Tr.pp, 379,
281, 287, 5874, 6083),
Report on state <if preparation for v;ar economic mobilization
as of 30 September 19.34. (EC-128, USA-623, Tr.pp. 295, 3557).
76. Law against Economic Sabotage, 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part l»p999.
77.
78.
80.
81.
82,
83.
84.
85,
Affidavit of Puhl, 2 November 1945. (EO-436, USAr-620, Tr.pp.
255, 2535).
Minutes of meeting of council of ministers on 27 May 1936.'
(1301-PS, p. 15, USA-123, Tr.p. 299),
English transcriut, p. 8342.
English transcript, c. 2135.
Excerpts from Diary kept by General Jodl, January 1937 to
August 1939 (1760-PS, USA-72, Tr.pp. 556, 1157),
Notes on a conference with Hitler in the Reich Chancellory,
Berlin, 5 November 1937, signed by Hitler't-- Adjutant, Hossbach,
and dated 10 November 1937 (386-PS, U5A-25, Tr.pp, 336, 735,
2137),
File *f papers fxi Case Green (the plan for the attack on
Czechoslovakia) kept by Schmundt* Hitler's Adjutant, jipril-
October 1938 (388-PS, USA-26, Tr,pp. 735, 741-74B, 760-765.
769-776. 793, *89-807).
Excerpts from Diary kept by General Jodl., Janua.ry 1937 to
August 1939 (1760-PS, USA-72, Tr.pp. 556, 1157).
File of papers cn Case Green (the plan for the attack on
Czechoslovakia) l:ept by Schmundt, Hitler's Adjutant, April-
October 1938 (388-PS, USA-26, Tr.pp. 744),
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86.
87,
88.
89,
90,
91.
92,
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Documents found in official ^ayy files containing notes year
"by year, from 1927 to 1940, on reconstruction of the German
Navy, and dated IS February 1938, 8 March 1938, September
1938, (C-23, USA-49, Tr.p.449).
"Germany neither intends or v/ishes to interfere in the internal
affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to unite v/ith Austria,"
Berlin, May 21, 1935, Voelkischer Beobachter, May 22, 1935,
"Immediately after the Anschluss, I informed Yugoslavia that
the frontier in common with that country v/ould henceforth be
regarded as unalterable by Germany and that we wished to live
v/ith her in peace and friendship." (Berlin, Oct. 6, 1939,
Voelkischer Beobachter, October 7, 1939. "I have given binding
declarations to a number of states. None of those can complain
that even a trace of a demand contrary thereto has ever been
made to them by Germany. None of the Scandinavian statesmen,,
for example, can contend that the German Government or that
German public opinion has ever uuide a demand which v/as incompat
ible with the sovereignty and integrity of their state." Berlin,
April 28, 1939, Yoelkischer Beobachter, i^ril 29, 1939, "V/e ,
have given guarantees to the states in the Nost and have guar
anteed to all contiguous neighbors the inviolability of their
territory as far as Germany is concerned. Biat is not a phrase;
that is our sacred v/ili." Berlin, September 26, 1938, Voelkis
cher Beobachter, September 27, 1938. "Without taking the past
into account, Germany has concluded'a non-aggression pact with
Poland. This is more than a valuable contribution to European
peace, and we shall adhere to it wiconditionally. Ne only hope
that it will be renewed and continued uninterruptedly and that
it will deerjen the friendly relations betv/een the two countries.
V^ith the understanding and heartfelt friendship of genuine
nationalists, we recognl-ze Poland as the home cf a great and
nationally conscious people." Berlin, May 21, 1935, Voelkischer
Beobachter, Mtay 22, 1935. "Tjorraany has steadily given her
assurance, ajid I solemnly repeat this assurance here, that ber-
tween ourselves and Frfjnce, for example, there are no grounds
for qviarrel thet are humanly thinkable." Berlin, January 30,
3937, Voelkischer Beobauhter, January 31, 1937,
Notes cn conference between Goering, Mussolini, and Ciano, 15
April 1939 (1874-PS. USAr-125, Tr.p, 929),
Note for Heichminister, 26 August 1938 (TO-76, GB-31, Tr,p, 980).
Speech of ITuehrer at a conference, 23 November 1933, to v/hich
.'•11 Supreme Commanders weyo ordered (7B5-PS, USA-23, Sr.pp. 375,
931).
Minutes of cpnference with Goering at the Air Ministry, 14
October 1938, concerning acceleration of rearmament (1301-PS,
USA-123, Tr.pp, 295, 296, 299, 300, 2555, 25afe, 2558, 2559,
5126). Notes on conference with Goering in Westerland on 26
July 1939, signed Mueller, dated Berlin, 27 July 1939 (R-123,
X;5if-124, Tr.p. 928).
Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939 "Indoctrination on the
Political Situation and Future Aims." (1^-79, USA-27, Tr.pp. .359,
408, 930), .
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Footnote
^ dumber
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
Minutes of
IQ-^Q ^ Meeting of Heich Defense <>jcncil, 23 June^3787-PS, Uait-?83, Tr.pp. 6406, 6167, 1287&-12886).
PolTt^^ cpnforenoe, 23 May 1939, "Indoctrination on the359' loe! S30K
USr!73f?r.|!'^ 7^.®°'^ ^"®'.^® ^1375-PS,
Hiierack's notes, 18 Septemher 1942, on discussion with
hiiiir.aer concerning delivery of Jews to HiinB.ler for extermina-
tion through work (654~PS, USA-218, Tr.pn. 1350,- 1950). Letter
Poles'Prosecutors, 1 j^ril 1944, concerning
° are released from Penal institutions ofDepartraent oi Justice (701-PS, pA-497. Tr.p. 1940).
27 April 1943 to Comi-nanders of Concentration Cmtos,
egarding executions of prisoners (1933-PS, USA-459, Tr.p. 1844).
Copy of^telegrairi from I^ellor to Himmler. 16 December 19-12.
concerning recruiting Jewish la.'feor (1472~PS, USA~279. Tr.p Ia^o.)
Mueller's order, 17 Deoeri-hr..-r ioao - ^ > -ti.p.
for work fn ho 1-4:^, concerning prisoners qualified
1354). ooncontratlon ca.v.ps .(lQ63-I>-PS, USA-219,
Epoer's conference ninutos of Central Planning Board, 19A3_A4
STr 1944, giving support to Ifevy andMerchant Marine. (C-195 , GB-211, Tr. p. 2709). ^ ^
Speer's conference minutes of Central Planning Board, 19Ao_44
IsL '^sol) " 39. Tr.p4 lissf•
aroM"orLfre'Lr?^®"'^ ®^ concerning(S(l-3™8?soviet prisoners of war
English transcript, p. 6016,
Tor^m^^da^ IsaufH^h^^nm^ and proposed counter
^59)? October 1938. (i)-3, USA~90. Tr.p.
English transcript p. 5786.
Report by Raeder to Hitler. 16 October'1939 CG-157- GB-2P4
Tr.p. 2734).
Sefehlshaber der U-bootes; Secret Standing Orderl\o. 154 signed by Doenitz. (D-S-.., G-B~196, Tr.p. 2663).
Operation Order "Atlantic" Ho. 56 for U~boats i« Atlprt^r>
7 October 1943 (D-663. OB-200, Tr.p. 2666).
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Footnote
Mim'ber
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119,
120.
121.
122.
English trjiTiscript, p. 6069,
English transcript, p. 5843.
English transcript, p. 6050-6052.
Extracts from testimony of Ooering: "As soon as we had come
into power we v/ere decided to keep that power under all circum
stances... v/e could not leave this to the play of coincidence
by v/a.y of elections and parliamentary majorities..." (Tr.p.5824).
"The Laender Parliaments... I considered entirely superfluous...
I could not iinderstand why so many different authorities should
exist which, with their unnecessary frictions, discussions,
arguments, could only prevent constructive work... A further
point in the strengthening of power was the elimination of the
Reichstag as a parliament... In some cases we suggested to the
former parties they dissolve themselves, because they had no
purpose, and those who would not dissolve themselves were dis
solved by us." (Tr*P' 5828). "...Towards the further strengthening
of pcv/er, those laws were established which... did away with the
so-called freedoms..." (Tr.p, 5829). See also Tr.p, 6049, 6051.
Frick accurately predicted the Nazi method of dealing with
political opponents when he declared to aii opposing member of
the Reichstag in 1932, "Don't worry, when we are in power,
we shall put all of you guys into concentration camps."
(Affidavit of Gebhart H. Seger, L-83, USA-234).
English transcript, p. 6064.
English transcript, p. 6054.
English transcript, p. 5860.
Stenographic report of the meeting on The Jev/ish Q,uestion,
under the Chairmanship of Fieldraarshal Ooering, 12 November
193S, (1B16-PS, USA*261, Tr.p. 1440).
Memorandum, 19 November 1938, concerning meeting of Reich
Defense Council (3575-PS, USA-781: Tr.p. 6406, 6157). See also
Tr.p. 5846. For similar reasons Goering preferred the destruction
of Jews ra'.nu.r than of their property (1816-PS).
English transcript, p.,
Other factors I'ere net o-v.rrlceked;. Ore of the reasons for
von Neurath's selection ?.s Foreign M:inister at the bvginning
of the Nazi regime was his excellent connections abroad.
(Tr.p. 6624).
Hitler's speech to Oommanders-in^^Ghief, 22 Augu.st 1939
(l014r'PS, USA-30, Tr. p. 377).
Affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks, 20 November 1945 (2751-PS,
USA~482, Tr, p. 1907), Likewise, Jodl noted in his diary a few
weeks before the plajined invasion of Norway that the Fuehrer
was still looking for an excuse for the operation (iBOO-PS
G-3-88, Tr.p, 1088, 2403).
Case Green v/ith wider implications, report of Intelligence
Division, Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August 1Q3B. (375-PS
USAr-84, Tr.p. 752).
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s:
123. Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, "Indoctrination on the
political situation and future aims." (L~79, USA-27, Tr.pp^
359. 408, 930),
124, Goering has accepted rGsponsi'oility for the Ifurnherg Lav7s, v/hich '
he signed (Tr.p. 5871), for the Austrian Anschluss (Tr.p. 5895),
and for the use ff prisoners of war in sTmsiient industries
([Tr.p, 6819). V6n Sohirach has admitted responsibility for the
training of the Hitler Youth: "It is. my guilt tha.t I educated
the German youth for a man v;ho committed murders million-fold.
I believed in that man. That is all that I can say as an ex
planation fwir my attitude. But that guilt is my own, my personal
guilt, I had the responsibility for the youth. I carried the
authority ff command; and so I alone carry the guilt for that
youth," 10295). Frank has admitted, "I feel a terrible
guilt vdthinme." (Tr.p. 8092),
125, Goering blamed persecution of the churches on Himmler and
Bormann. Tr.p. 5856. Schirach blamed extermination of the
Jews on Hitler and Himmler: "The murder was ordered by Adolf
Hitler... he nnd Himmler together committed that crime, which
of ell time* is the darkest spot in our' history. It is a crime
which is shameful to every German," (Tr.p. 10293).
126. Final argument of Dr. Stahmer, counsel for Goering. Tr. pp.
12973, et seq..
127. "The Nazi Plan," excerpt ^f script of a motion picture compceed
of captured German film. (3054-PS, USA-167, Tr.p. 1264).
128, Goering testified: "No, I did ni»t want any war..." Tr.p. 6087,
Eibbentrop testified: "The Fuehirer has — and then I have upon
his orders, .and I believe'I may be a good witness for it myself
alv/ays tried to solve these problems in a diplomatic wa^/."
Tr.p. 6886,
189, Goering testified: "to set aside Versailles, the Sta.te had to
be strong, for a weak State was rtipver listened to; that we knew
from experience." Tr.p. 6070.
130. Goering testified: "I told the Fuehrer that in spite of this
principal point of view I oversa.v/ a menace threatening from
Hussia; I still would ask him t« rather let this menace continue
to exist and, if it was at all possilDle, to try to direct the
interests of Russia against England." Tr. p. 5957,
131. English transcript, p. 6048,
132. English transcript, pp. 5894-5, 6036, 6069^
153. English trajiscript, p. 5998.
134. Other defendants aaraitted that the wars were aggressive.
Schacht testified: "Q,. Well, we fo\md something v/e agree on,
Doctor. You knew of the invasion of Poland? A. Yes, Q., As
an unqus.lified act of aggression on Hitler's part? A. Absolutely.
Q,. And of Holland? A, Absolutely. Q,. And of Denmark?
A. Absolutely. And of Norway? A, Absolutely. Q. And of
Yugoslavia? A. Absolutely. Q,, And of Russia? A, Absolutely,
sir: and Norway and Belgium, which you left out," Tr. p. 8S10.
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Bimfeer
135.
136.
137.
138.
139,
140,
141,
142,
143.
144.
145,
146.
. 148
Gooriiig testifiedl "I urged him not .-^t that moment or an oven
short time thereafter to start aji;/ war against Russia,." Tr.p.
5956; see also Tr.p. 6056. Keitel testified that he wrote a
memorandijun t^ Hitler opposing the attack on Russia. He said:
"But I did in that memorandum most certainly/ refer to the fact
that the Hon-aggression Pact existed." Tr.p. 7096.
iglish transcript, p. 12929.
OK'/ Directive for Unified Preparation for War 1937-1938, vdth
covering letter from von Blomherg, 24 June 1937. (C-175, USA-69,
Tr.p. 547). Yet it was in this period that Goering was trying
cut the strength of his Luftv/aff^ in the Spanish Civil V/ar •
('Tr.p. 5871). Goering has admittod the non-defensive nature
of the Luftwaffe (Tr.p. 5859).
Pinal argument of Dr. Stahmer, counsel for Gooring. "Thoreforo,
a conspiracy v;ith a dictator at its head is a. ccntra,diction in
itself. A dictator does not enter into a conspiracy v/ith his
followers, he does not m-eke any agreement v;ith them, he dictates."
Tr.-o. 12970.
English transcript, p. 12155.
English transcript, p. 12183.
English transcript, pp/5854, 6036, 6056.
Extracts from Organization Bonk of the NSDAP, 1943 edition.
(1893-PS, USA'323, Tr.p. 1576).
Criminrl Code, 1871, Sec. 188 (never repealed).
Goering testified: "In the case of Schacht he was a very strong
personality and whilst not wanting to oVer-ompha.size my importance
and disregarding whether we were friends or not, on the "basis of
the tv/o positions we had to get into difficulties and cne or the
other had to cede finally." Tr.p. 6082.
'Q. Mr. Dahlerus, will you tell me v/hether I got all of your
last answer to Dr. Stahmer correctly? Did you say that 'I then
realized that it was on the 26th of September, that his, Goering's-
aim, had "been to split Poland <-u:i.d grab and occupy Poland with the
consent of Great Britain*? Is that right? A. Yes, it is correct,
but I should like to say It was,the German Government's, inclu- '
ding Goering's, aim." Tr.p. 6119, The Etiohrer informed Goering
some time before the attack, on Poland was Xaunchei3 that the task
was to "eliminate British intervention." (TC-90, GD-64).
Hitler's siOGech to Commandors-in-Chief, 22 August 1939.
(l014r-PS, USAr-30, Tr.p. 376),
Prank Diary. Tagcbuch. 1 January 1944 to 28 Pebruary I944.
Entry of 14 January, 15 January, 8 Pebruary 1944. (2233-33lps
UGA-295, Tr.p. '1501).
Hote, 11 April 1943, and report of spoech of Koch in Kiev on
5 March 1943, concerning treatment of civilian population in
Ukraine, (1130-PS, U5A-169, Tr.p. 1269).
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149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158,
159,
160.
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Frank testified: "Q. Did'^ you e^er participate in the destruc
tion of Jev;s? A. I say yes, and the reason why I say yes is
"because, "being under the impression of. these five months of . .
this trial, and particularly under the impression of the state
ments made "by the witness Hoess, I cannpt allov; it "before my
conscience that respcnsi"bility for all feis should "be handed
over to these small people alone. I myself have never installed
an extermination camp for Jev/s or demanded that they should oe
installed, "but if Molf Hitler personal3.y has turned that
dreadful responsibility over to these people of his, then it
must be mine too. We have fought against Jewry; we have fought
against it for years; and we have allowed ourselves to make ,
utterances, and ray own diary has become a v/itness against
me in this connection — utterances which are terrible. It
is my duty — my only duty^— therefore, to answer your ques
tion in this connection v;ith Yes. A thousand years will pass
and this guilt of Germany vjill. still not be erased." (Tr-p. 8099.)
Funk expla.incd that he did not hold "the position of minister as
one v/ould generally think of it." (Tr.p, 9014).
Ribbentrop, Xr.p. 6857, 6823; Eeitol. Tr.p. 7157; Tr.p,
9118; Gooring, Tr.p. 6247.
English transcript, p. 8910, supra note 121.
English transcript, p. 8808, 8814-17, 8923-25.
"The fact was that Hitler tried to use this defeat for the
self-destructiipn of the German people, as Speer ha,s testified
and confirmed, in a most terrible way, and as I could observe
in the last phase of the conflict in Berlin when, under the
pretense of a false hope, fifteen-year-old, fourteen-year-old,
and thirteen-year-old boys were equipped for war with hand
firearms and called into battle, boys who perhaps might have
been the hope for the period of rfeconstniction^ Hitler fled
into death, and he left the decree and the order to keep on .
fighting. He also left the official report that he ha.d died
in'battle, I learned that he had committed euicide, and my
last public statement, on 2 May 1945, v;as the publication of
the fact of this suicide, for I wanted to kill a Hitler legend
in the bud." (Tr.p. 12547). Dahlerus has recorded his impres
sion of Hitler, before the war, as "a completely abnormal
person." (Tr,p. 6125).
English transcript, p. 12080.
English transcript, p. 12117,
Milch testifiedr "My offer that I would try to speak to
Hitler against war once more was rejected by the Reichsmarshal
as absolutely hopeless." (Ir.p, 5576).
English transcript, p. 12118.
English transcript, p. 6881.
Minutes of seecnd session of Working Committee of the Reich
Defense Council held on 26 April 1933. (EO-177, USA-390,
Tr.pp. 1699, 1727),
18 ••
y V.
-,1^-
. .
.'•^1
f/'i >
Footnote
Numb3r
t
161. Eaeder testified: "!Iliat is the circumvention of the Versailles
Treaty as far as that was necessary to improve our defenses,
which I explained during the recent days here. It was a matter
cf honor for every man to do it." (Tr.p. 9919).
162. G-oering tCvstified. "During a conversation v/hich I had with
Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop who was in" London at that
time, I stressed that the ultimatum had not been put by
ourselves but by Seyss-Inquart. That v;as absolutely true.
Legally, in fact, of course I out it, but that telephone
conversation \ias heard on the English side and I had to conduct
a diplomatic conversation, and I have never heard yet that
diplomats in such cases say later hov; it was in fact, but they
always stress how it v;as do Jiire, and why should I be an
exception there?" (Tr.p. 5891). But the transcript of the
telephone conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquaxt v/hich
led to the capitulation of Austria shov;s Goering saying:
"Nov;, remember the following: You go immediately together
with Lt. General I-fuff andi tell the Federal President that if
the conditions which are known to you are not accepted immedi
ately, the troops who are already stationed in and advancing
to the frontier xvill march in tonight along the whole line,
and Austria will cease to exist." Jranscrint of telephone
calls from Air zMinistry, 11-14 March 19S8. " (2949-PS,"uSA-76,
Tr.u. 56.6).
163. German assurance to Czechoslovakia of 11 Ma,rch 1938.
(TC-27, GB-21, Tr.p. 962).
164. Speer's conference minutes of Central Planning Board, 1943-44,
concerning labor supply. (R-124, USA-179, Tr.pn. 1286, 1293,
1309, 2989 )•.
165. English transcript, p. 5878.
166. English transcript, p. 6150.
167, English transcript, p. 5900; see also Tr.p. 5998.
168. English transcriut, p. 8527.
169. English transcript, pp. 8516-19.
170. English transcript, p. 13876.
171. English transcript, p. 6857,
172. Example s pf the application of this philosophy may be found
in Goering's explanati^j^i v xidu.
to put his pictures in a gallery which he intended to construct
for the German people — some day (Tr.p. 5934); his statement
that he had always held that captured enemy airmen were to be
treated as "comrades" (Tr.p. 5979); and his attempt to minimize
his words advocating harsh treatment of the Jews, as the result
of conversational excitement (Tc.p. 6192),
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